

**PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA WHILE
PREVENTING AND COUNTERING
VIOLENT EXTREMISM****A BÉKEFENNTARTÁS ÉS AZ ERŐSZAKOS
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KAPCSOLATA AFRIKÁBAN**BOTHÁ, Anneli¹**Abstract**

It is well documented that peacekeeping operations had changed dramatically since its inception. This is particular evident in Africa where peacekeepers need not only to manage conflicts, but also become entangled in a recent debate regarding the prevention and combatting of violent extremism. Based on the unique manifestation of the threat through organizations such as al-Shabaab and Boko Haram aimed at capturing territory in Somalia and Nigeria, these organizations became a hybrid between insurgency and terrorist organizations. In addition to the aim of these organizations' increasing attacks directed at the local population placing them in the realm of terrorism. Considering the magnitude and resources required to actively deal with these threats the Nigerian government and the African Union try to eliminate these terror organisations. The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was also established to mediate between Morocco and the POLISARIO, unable to meet its initial mandate.

Keywords

Countering violent extremism (CVE), preventing violent extremism (PVE), antiterrorism, counterterrorism, insurgency, asymmetric warfare, MNJTF, AMISOM, MINURSO, DDR

Absztrakt

Jól dokumentálható, hogy a békefenntartó műveletek a kezdetek óta drámaian megváltoztak. Ez különösen nyilvánvaló Afrikában, ahol a békefenntartóknak nemcsak a konfliktusok kezelésére kell figyelniük, hanem szabályozni az erőszakos szélsőségek megelőzésével és leküzdésével kapcsolatos közelmúltbeli vitákat. A fenyegetés olyan jelenléte, mint az al-Shabaab és a Boko Haram, amelyek célja Szomália és Nigeria területének elfoglalása volt, ezek a szervezetek a felkelők és a terrorista szervezetek hibridjévé váltak. Amiatt, hogy ezeknek a szervezeteknek a növekvő támadásai a helyi lakosság felé irányultak, a terrorizmushoz hasonló helyzetbe hozták őket. Figyelembe véve a fenyegetések aktív kezeléséhez szükséges nagyságrendet és erőforrásokat, a nigériai kormány és az Afrikai Unió megpróbálja felszámolni ezeket a terrorszervezeteket. Az ENSZ nyugat-szaharai népszavazási missziója (MINURSO) szintén azért jött létre, hogy közvetítsen Marokkó és a POLISARIO között, de ez nem tud eleget tenni eredeti megbízatásának.

Kulcsszavak

extrémizmus, antiterrorizmus, lázadás, aszszimetrikus hadviselés, terrorellhárítás, MNJTF, AMISOM, MINURSO, DDR

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INTRODUCTION

It is well documented that peacekeeping operations had changed dramatically since their inception to the point that new doctrine is being called for. This is particularly evident in peacekeeping operations in Africa, where peacekeepers need not only to manage conflict towards a peaceful outcome, but can easily become entangled in not only the mission, but also the way peacekeepers conduct themselves. Therefore, nudging peacekeeping closer to the more recent debate regarding the prevention and combating of violent extremism is important. Based on the unique manifestation of the threat as presented by al-Shabaab and Boko Haram aimed at capturing territory in Somalia and Nigeria, these organizations in the two countries became a hybrid between insurgency and terrorist organisations.

It is not debated that violent extremism affects all four core areas the United Nations (UN) works in namely: peace and security, humanitarian assistance, human rights and development. To achieve these core principles, peacekeeping is an essential component in assisting countries confronted with conflict to recover to attain sustainable peace once again, security and development. The role of peacekeeping operations therefore fits squarely into the need to find peaceful solutions to longstanding conflicts as captured under Pillar 1 of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Included are initiatives to prevent conflict, achieve durable political settlements, protect civilians and sustain peace. A critical challenge peacekeepers face is the use of force. It is also one of the most prominent challenges that can place the overall objectives of the mission in jeopardy. This debate on the use of force, however, cannot be conducted without understanding the environment under which these operations take place and how peacekeepers deal with these threats. Consequently, recognizing the UN's efforts in countering terrorist narratives (UN Resolution 2354 of 2017) dedicated initiatives need to be taken to prevent extremist groups, such as al-Shabaab to use the conduct of peace builders as a justification for their actions. For example, from the indiscriminate shooting in the aftermath of an attack (to recruit new members and justify its existence, while placing a question mark on the legitimacy of the mission) to the organisation's ability to successfully attack and overrun bases.

In addition to Pillar I, Pillar III through building capacity of host States, and Pillar IV on human rights are equally relevant to peacekeeping operations in Africa. Consequently, Ban Ki-moon the then-Secretary-General, when introducing the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism on 15 January 2016, stressed his intention to integrate PVE into relevant peacekeeping activities in accordance with peacekeeping mandates. [1]

A high-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations assessed a broad range of issues facing peacekeeping and special political missions, including: Changing nature of conflict; evolving mandates and peace building challenges; managerial and administrative arrangements; planning; human rights and protection of civilians. The first part of the chapter will include the following broad themes: The changing nature of conflicts and peacekeeping in Africa; the mandates of recent peacekeeping missions and the challenges peacekeepers are being confronted with. It will also identify current missions and the involvement of African countries in these missions.

Peacekeepers being in the frontline against violent extremism and the ideology it represents will require them to approach these missions from a counterinsurgency perspective. Recognising that peacekeepers not only have to deal with the direct manifestation of these violent extremist groups, but also how the mission is being conducted. The latter will

have a direct impact on preventing others to join these extremist groups (preventing violent extremism or PVE). Assessing the impact AMISOM had in countering and preventing violent extremism, the second part of this chapter will briefly reflect on the reasons and motivating factors that facilitated radicalisation and recruitment into al-Shabaab. The chapter will conclude with the future of peacekeeping in Africa and measures to enhance its success.

DEFINING PEACEKEEPING AND OTHER IMPORTANT CONCEPTS

Considering that maintaining peace is one of the core functions of the United Nations under its Charter, while one of the objectives of the African Union is ‘to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent’[2], it is necessary to briefly define peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. Since these forces are being deployed in hostile areas, reference need to be made to the concepts ‘insurgency’ and ‘terrorism’.

According to Ramsbotham and Woodhouse in Bruwer, ‘peacekeeping’ is defined by the UN as “an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict.”[3] While Green, Kahl and Diehl explain that “peacekeeping operations may be deployed at various stages of a conflict, ranging from before any violence occurs to during a full scale war”[3], the UN refers to peacekeeping as “a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.”. [4]

Peace enforcement “involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority.”.[4]

Peace building “involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development.”. [4] The UN consider peace building as a complex and long-term process to create the necessary conditions for sustainable peace by addressing the causes of the conflict. [4]

Considering the challenges in defining ‘terrorism’, this chapter will use the AU definition of a ‘terrorist act’ as presented in Article 1 (3) of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999) [5] as:

- “any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:
 - Intimidate, put fear into, force, coerce or induce agovernment, body, institution, the general public or asegment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or act according to certainprinciples; or

- disrupt any public service, the delivery of an essential service to the public, or to create a public emergency; or
- create general insurrection in a State.

An insurgency can be defined [6] as:

...a protracted political-military struggle directed toward subverting or displacing the legitimacy of a constituted government or occupying power and completely or partially controlling the resources of a territory through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations.

It is also important to make a distinction between preventing violent extremism (PVE) and counter violent extremism' (CVE): Preventing violent extremism (PVE) broadly includes initiatives to prevent radicalization, recruitment and mobilization of individuals (who have not been radicalised yet) into terrorist groups that include an entire array of role-players. The focus is on preventive measures, which directly address the drivers of violent extremism. Counter violent extremism' (CVE) aims at reaching those already radicalised and includes the whole spectrum of instruments and not only what normally resonates under counterterrorism. It also includes the principle of moving away from a military-led to a criminal justice-led approach.

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN AFRICA

According to the UN, peace operations are deployed on the basis of mandates from the United Nations Security Council. However, in response to changing patterns of conflict and in an attempt to address the different types of threat to peace and security, UN peace operations have expanded significantly to include the following four primary objectives[7]:

1. Deploy to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of conflict across borders;
2. Stabilize conflict situations after a ceasefire, to create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement;
3. Assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements;
4. Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development.

In addition to the above mentioned four primary peace enforcement responsibilities, UN peacekeepers are often mandated to play a role in the following peace building activities:

1. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants;
2. Mine action;
3. Security sector reform and other rule of law-related activities;
4. Protection and promotion of human rights;
5. Electoral assistance;
6. Support for the restoration and extension of State authority;
7. Promotion of social and economic recovery and development.

The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) – considered to be the longest UN peacekeeping operation in Africa – was initially established by the Security Council on 29 April 1991 to fulfil both peace enforcement and peace build-


ing mandates. With reference to the former, the Mission was sanctioned following the settlement proposals between Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) on 30 August 1988. This settlement plan provided for a transitional period to prepare for a referendum in which the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco (peace building). MINURSO was originally mandated to monitor the ceasefire; reduce the threat of unexploded ordnances and mines; verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the disputed territory; monitor the confinement of Moroccan and POLISARIO troops to designated areas; initiate steps with both parties to ensure the release of all Western Saharan political prisoners and detainees; oversee the exchange of prisoners of war (through the International Committee of the Red Cross or ICRC); and repatriate Western Saharan refugees (the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or UNHCR to take the lead). MINURSO was, however, unable to fulfil its mandate in relation to the referendum that included steps to identify and register qualified voters and organise and ensure a free and fair referendum. Till date, the mission continues to monitor the ceasefire; reduce the threat of mines and unexploded ordnances; and to provide logistic support to the UNHCR-led confidence building measures) between the two parties, who suspended discussions in June 2014. In addition to its initial mission, MINURSO has also been called to provide assistance to irregular migrants, as well as providing humanitarian assistance in case of natural disasters. [8]

In a struggle over natural resources – in this case land – the conflict in Darfur (western Sudan) also has an ethnic character as being a conflict between the majority Arab community versus African groups like the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit. The said groups felt marginalised and it manifested in limited development in Darfur. Consequently, the latter launched a surprise attack on the airport of Fasher – the capital of North Darfur – in April 2003. The Sudanese government responded with air power and an Arab militia, known as the Janjaweed. Subsequent abuses led to the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant against Sudan's then-president Omar al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity (March 2009) and genocide (July 2010). The genocide charge alleged that he had overseen an attempt to wipe out part of the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit communities' [9] and following growing evidence came to light in March 2004 that the Janjaweed carried out systematic killings of non-Arab villagers in Darfur. On the other side of the conflict, African groups are mainly represented by two Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) factions and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). In 2011, these three groups consolidated their efforts with the SPLM-North rebels (operational in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states) to become known as the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). [9]

In an attempt to find a peaceful settlement to the Darfur conflict, with the support of the AU and UN, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed on 5 May 2006. Due to limited support for the agreement, negotiations between 2010 and June 2011 under AU-UN mediation produced the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. On another front, following high-level consultations between the AU and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in November 2006 the existing African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) became a joint AU/UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur or better known as the African Union - UN hybrid operation in Darfur or UNAMID that formally took over from AMIS on 31 December 2007.[10] The mandate of the Mission can be summarised as the following: protect civilians; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and ensure the safety of

humanitarian personnel; mediate between the Government of Sudan and non-signatory armed movements with the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur as framework; and support the mediation of community conflict, including through measures to address its root causes. [11]

On 1 July 2010 the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo or MONUSCO took over from the United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), an earlier UN peacekeeping operation in the country. The original mandate of the mission authorized all necessary means to protect civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent physical threat and to support the Government of the DRC in its efforts to stabilise the country and secure peace. In response to growing insecurity in eastern DRC, in March 2013 the Security Council decided to create a specialized intervention brigade (within the 19,815 troop ceiling) that would consist of three infantry battalions, one artillery and one special force and reconnaissance company with the responsibility of neutralizing armed groups and therefore reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security. The creation of the specialised intervention brigade took the principles of peace enforcement to a level beyond traditional peacekeeping to be able to address a number of rebel groups in the eastern part of the DRC. While none of these groups – as reflected in Map 1 – present a similar threat in the form of al-Shabaab in Somalia, the majority of these groups are remnants of other conflicts in the region, for example the genocide in Rwanda as well as instability in Uganda. Their presence poses a real threat to local communities that have to bear the blunt of attacks after these rebel groups exploited the DRC government’s limited presence in the region.



1. Map Position of Rebel Groups in the DRC in November 2012 [12]

Consequently, a safe haven was created from Kinshasa, (the capital) considering the distance between Kinshasa and Goma in the east is 2,679 kilometres. [13] However, according to the Congo Research Group (CRG), the ADF has gradually shifted its rhetoric employed from being at war against the Ugandan government to a broader struggle for Islam since 2016. According to the CRG, the ADF also changed its name to Madina at Tauheed-Wau Mujahedeen (MTM) which translates as the city of monotheism and holy warriors. Further adding to evidence that the ADF is forging closer links with the Islamic State (IS) or Daesh: in February 2018, DRC soldiers found a Daesh-published book on the body of a dead ADF militant [14]. Then on 18 April 2019, Islamic State claimed responsibility for its first attack in the DRC and declared it the “Central Africa Province” of the “Caliphate.” The attack took place on 16 April, during which two Congolese soldiers and a civilian were killed in a shootout. According to MONUSCO, the attack took place in Bovata near Beni close to the border with Uganda. IS also claimed a higher toll of five soldiers killed and three wounded. [15]

Moving to instability in Mali: During mid-January 2012, a Tuareg movement known as the Mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), along with Islamist extremist groups including Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) initiated a series of attacks against government forces in the north of the country that had experienced a number of Tuareg rebellions due to a history of marginalisation. Earlier periods of instability, the aftermath of the Arab Spring in Libya, the uncontrolled flow of weapons and the atmosphere of instability and revolt in the region created a perfect storm. Capitalising on anti-government sentiments disaffected soldiers from units that had been defeated by the armed groups in the north, organized a military coup d’état on 22 March 2012. A military junta led by Captain Amadou Sanogo took over power, suspended the Constitution and dissolved government institutions, facilitating the collapse of the State in the north, thus allowing MNLA to easily overrun government forces in Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu and proclaiming an independent State of Azawad on 6 April. However, growing tensions between armed groups in the north led to Ansar Dine and MUJAO driving MNLA out of the main towns of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal in November 2012. In fear of another failed state in the region that would increase the foothold of Islamist extremists in the region, the Security Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on 25 April 2013 to support political processes in Mali while addressing insecurity. The initial mandate of the mission was to ‘support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilization of the country and implementation of the transitional roadmap.’ On 25 June 2014 the Security Council further increased the mandate of the Mission to the duty of ensuring the security, stabilization and protection of civilians; to support national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting in the re-establishing of State authority; the rebuilding of the security sector (Security Sector Reform); and to promote and protect human rights.[16] On 28 June 2018 the Security Council extended MINUSMA’s mandate for another year, maintaining its 13,289 troops and 1,920 police personnel contingent.[17]

On 10 April 2014 the Security Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic or MINUSCA after taking over from the African Union Mission in the Central African Republic or MISCA that was operational between December 2013 and September 2014. MINUSCA was given the

primary mandate to protect civilians after Séléka, (meaning ‘coalition’ in Sango, the local language) consisting of predominately Muslim fighters led by Michel Djotodia, escalated its insurgency against the then president, Francois Bozize (a Christian). Bozize was removed from power in March 2013 but instability remained. Following atrocities committed by Séléka from 2012 against Christians (the majority), the latter formed vigilantes known as the anti-balaka (‘anti-machete’), which in turn initiated atrocities against Muslims.[18] In addition to protect civilians, MINUSCA was also mandated to support the transition process; facilitate humanitarian assistance; promote and protect human rights; initiate steps to facilitate programs that would enhance respect for justice and the rule of law; and lastly to take the lead in establishing disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) processes.[19] On 13 December 2018 the Security Council decided to maintain MINUSCA’s troop level of up to 11,650 military personnel to ensure the mission would be capable to protect the civilian population under the strategic objective of supporting the “creation of the political, security and institutional conditions conducive to the reduction of the presence of, and threat posed by, armed groups through a comprehensive and robust approach and robust posture”. [20]

UN officials have traditionally distinguished between missions with resources and political support to achieve their objectives and missions that lacked the resources and political leverage needed to support and facilitate political processes. The latter includes the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), Darfur (UNAMID), South Sudan (UNMISS), Mali (MINUSMA) and the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). Those in the DRC and South Sudan are also included that intended to facilitate political processes. However, as a result of continuous violence, it led to the concept of “conflict management” operations. These missions intend to deter the escalation of violence; contain the conflict; protect civilians; and attempts to initiate or revive a peace process.[21]

While UNMISS and UNAMID focus on the protection of civilians and providing humanitarian assistance, the main role of MINUSMA is to limit terrorist operations in Northern Mali. During 2018 the regional G5 Sahel Force operating across Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, faced security and governance challenges in its attempt to restore stability in the Sahel.[22] UNMISS and MONUSCO are working with recalcitrant national leaders, who actively oppose UN interference in their affairs but MINUSCA is trying to stabilize a country without any real national authority.

Notwithstanding the mentioned differences in focus, Gowan points out that all of the above missions experienced three common factors: Firstly, all were confronted by persistent violence, including threats to their personnel; secondly, these missions had to deal with significant large-scale conflict-induced humanitarian crises; and lastly, these missions experienced limits on their ability to pursue clear political conflict resolution strategies, ‘whether due to a lack of credible national partners or poor relations with their host states’.[23]

Despite concerns raised by UN officials about the purpose and sustainability of these missions, conflict management operations have become a central type of UN missions in recent years.[24] Consequently, in addition to protecting civilians, peacekeepers are increasingly being dragged into becoming active participants into insurgencies, most notably al-Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the M23 militia in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The unfortunate reality with these missions was that all

were initiated despite extreme volatility and violence. These missions are confronted with the same circumstances that contributed to the conflict in the first place, most notably growing state failure. State collapse manifests in political, economic and social decline. Starting with political experiences, political marginalisation and the growing inability to affect change through legitimate means contribute to limited trust in the political process marked by rapidly decreasing legitimacy of the government and its institutions. This ultimately contributes to political revolt and rebel groups contesting the authority of the existing regime. Economic stagnation, relative deprivation and ramped corruption lead to further decrease in the level of trust in those in power. On a social level religious and ethnic diversity and marginalisation complicate political and economic circumstances, especially when the country is disproportionately developed and certain members of the community do not experience the same privileges as others. Even if it is just a perception, the potential for radicalisation and recruitment into violent extremist organisations, ultimately leading to domestic conflict will increase. These political, social and economic grievances will be magnified if government and its security forces lose control over parts of the country that extremist groups use as a base from where they can launch their attacks. Confronted with these circumstances, peacekeepers have to insert themselves in the middle of a conflict, where their presence will often not be accepted by one or more parties. Without this legitimacy, peacekeepers will not be seen as honest brokers, but rather other parties to the conflict. Consequently, this type of missions will result in higher casualties as reflected in Figure 1.

In other words, missions are now largely engaged in conflict resolution rather than peace implementation, leading to the question: how is it possible to be involved in peacekeeping when there is no peace to keep? It is also for this reason that countries fitting the financial bill (most notably the United States) started to lose interest in the continuation of supporting peacekeeping operations as it is seen as a financial bottomless pit without tangible results. In addition to financial implications, casualties amongst peacekeepers started to raise questions in especially troop contributing countries, with the public asking whether loosing nationals in another country is really worth the human cost.

TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research institute (SIPRI) in 2018, of the 63 multilateral peacekeeping operations around the world, 25 (the largest number) were situated in Africa. In light of the demand, 75 percent of all peacekeeping personnel deployed were in Africa, while African countries contributed the most personnel,[25] of which Ethiopia was the biggest contributor. Table 1 summarises the position of African countries in peacekeeping operations in the world, the number of personnel made available to which recent missions and the number of overall fatalities. It also refers to the number of missions where the respective countries endured fatalities and which missions were the costliest in terms of losses experienced.

Position (overall)	Country	Men	Female	Total	Mission	Fatalities (missions & highest toll)
1	Ethiopia	6,896	623	7,519	MINUSMA UNAMID UNISFA UNMISS	128 10 missions: UNAMID (30) UNISFA (30)
3	Rwanda	6,141	405	6,546	MINUJUSTH MINUSCA UNAMID UNISFA UNMISS	55 7 missions: UNAMID (30) MINUSCA (11)
7	Egypt	3,765	8	3,773	MINURSO MINUSCA MINUSMA MONUSCO UNAMID UNMISS	41 14 missions: UNAMID (10) UNOSOM (7)
9	Ghana	2,401	394	2,795	MINURSO MINUSCA MUNISMA MONUSCO UNAMID UNDOF UNIFIL UNISFA UNMISS UNOWAS UNSOM UNSO	139 19 missions: ONUC (49) UNIFIL (33)
10	Senegal	2,493	147	2,640	MINUJUSTH MINUSCA MINUSMA MONUSCO UNAMID UNMISS	80 15 missions: UNAMID (17) UNIFIL (16)
12	Tanzania	2,162	187	2,349	MINUSCA MONUSCO UNAMID UNIFIL UNISFA UNMISS	53 7 missions: MONUSCO (31) UNAMID (15)
13	Morocco	2,113	29	2,142	MUNUSCA MONUSCO	43 8 missions: MINUSCA (10) UNOSOM (10)
14	Burkina Faso	1,985	104	2,089	MINUJUSTH MINUSCA MINUSMA MONUSCO UNAMID UNISFA	42 7 missions: MINUSMA (22) UNAMID (13)

Position (overall)	Country	Men	Female	Total	Mission	Fatalities (missions & highest toll)
					UNMISS	
15	Chad	1,471	20	1,491	MINUJUSTH MINUSMA MONUSCO	73 6 missions: MINUSMA (63) MINURCAT (6)
16	Togo	1,350	72	1,422	MINUJUSTH MINURSO MINUSCA MINUSMA MONUSCO UNAMID UNMISS	33 8 missions: MINUSMA (16) UNOCI (11)
17	South Africa	1,016	175	1,191	MONUSCO UNAMID UNMISS	43 5 missions: MONUC (18) UNAMID (10)
18	Cameroon	997	112	1,109	MINUJUSTH MINUSCA MINUSMA MONUSCO UNAMID	18 8 missions: MINUSCA (10) UNOCI (2)
20	Mauritania	1,046	3	1,049	MINUSCA MINUSMA UNSOS	9 4 missions: MINUSCA (6)
21	Zambia	920	118	1,038	MINUSCA MONUSCO UNAMID UNISFA UNMISS	79 15 missions: UNAMSIL (34) ONUMOZ (13)
22	Niger	947	43	990	MINUJUSTH MINUSCA MINUSMA MONUSCO	40 4 missions: UNOCI (19) MINUSMA (17)
24	Guinea	897	40	937	MINURSO MINUSCA MINUSMA MONUSCO UNISFA UNMISS	41 6 missions: MINUSMA (22) UNAMSIL (13)
25	Malawi	848	67	915	MINURSO MONUSCO UNAMID UNISFA UNMISS UNSOM	27 8 missions: MONUSCO (13) UNAMID (3)
30	Burundi	737	31	768	MINUSCA MINUSMA UNISFA	11 3 missions: MINUSCA (8)

Position (overall)	Country	Men	Female	Total	Mission	Fatalities (missions & highest toll)
					UNMHA	ONUB (2)
38	Uganda	485	73	558	UNMISS UNSOM UNSOS	6 2 missions: UNAMID (4) UNSOM (2)
39	Benin	485	23	508	MINUJUSTH MINUSCA MINUSMA MONUSCO UNISFA UNMISS	24 8 missions: UNOCI (6) MONUC (5)
40	Gabon	406	44	450	MINUSCA	MINUSCA (4)
42	Nigeria	332	102	434	MINUJUSTH MINURSO MINUSCA MINUSMA MONUSCO UNAMID UNFIL UNISFA UNMISS UNSOS	153 16 missions: UNAMID (39) UNAMSIL (33)
45	Côte d'Ivoire	276	25	301	MINUJUSTH MINURSO MINUSCA MINUSMA MONUSCO UNOWAS	22 5 missions: UNOCI (16) MONUSCO (3)
53	Tunisia	223	18	241	MINUJUSTH MINUSCA MINUSMA MONUSCO UNAMID UNMISS	20 8 missions: ONUC (11) MONUC (3)
56	Gambia	177	36	213	MINUSCA MINUSMA UNAMID UNMISS	13 3 missions: UNAMID (10) UNMIL (2)
60	Djibouti	173	7	180	MINUJUSTH MINURSO MINUSCA MONUSCO UNAMID UNMHA	2 1 mission: UNOCI (2)
62	Kenya	118	41	159	MINUSCA MINUSMA MONUSCO UNAMID	62 24 missions: UNAMSIL (16) UNMISS (4)

Position (overall)	Country	Men	Female	Total	Mission	Fatalities (missions & highest toll)
					UNIFIL UNMISS UNSOS	
63	Congo	141	17	158	MINUSCA	7 4 missions: MINUSCA (2) MONUSCO (2)
67	Liberia	108	8	116	MINUSMA	40 7 missions: UNMIL (34)
68	Zimbabwe	47	47	94	MINUSCA UNAMID UNISFA UNMISS	19 8 missions: UNAVEM (9) UNOSOM (4)
73	Sierra Leone	52	17	69	MINUSCA MINUSMA UNAMID UNIFIL UNISFA UNMISS UNSOM UNSOS	38 7 missions: UNAMSIL (16) UNAMID (14)
75	Namibia	38	18	56	UNAMID UNISFA UNMISS	16 5 missions: UNMIL (9) MONUA (4)
77	Mali	44	4	48	MINUJUSTH MINUSCA MONUSCO	12 6 missions: MINUSMA (7)
92	Madagascar	19	3	22	MINUJUSTH MINUSCA MINUSMA MONUSCO UNAMID	0
120	Algeria	2	0	2	MONUSCO	4 4 missions
121	DRC	1	0	1	MINUSCA	68 6 missions: MONUC (35) MONUSCO (28)
	Total	41,312	3,061	44,373		1,461

1. Table UN Troop Contributing Countries by Ranking as on 31 March 2019 and total fatalities [26]


In 2017 fatalities linked to hostile acts increased to 61 in contrast to 34 in 2016. Before 2017 the majority of fatalities amongst peacekeepers were associated with peace-

keeping operations in Mali (MINUSMA), the Central African Republic (MISCA), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with reference to MONUSCO and Darfur (UNAMID).[25] Figure 1 reflects on the number of fatalities per mission in Africa.

Considering the changes in the type of missions, especially in the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide (during the deployment of UNAMIR), UNAMSIL (October 1999 until December 2005) was the first mission, during which UN troops were permitted to use force. This was due to the support of General Roméo Dallaire, the commander of UNAMIR in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, a strong supporter for enhancing force capabilities. The argument for this position came from Article 39 in Chapter VII of the UN Charter that “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” The Security Council in Article 41 calls upon the parties concerned to “comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable” including military power.[27] Consequently, under UN Security Council Resolution 1270, UNAMSIL was given the mandate to: “take the necessary action, in the discharge of its mandate, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence”.[28] Despite allowing peacekeepers to use force, 192 UNAMSIL peacekeepers were killed over 74 months. UNOSOM II (from March 1993 to March 1995) was the deadliest mission with 154 fatalities considering the two year deployment period (with 6.42 peacekeepers killed per month over the deployment period), but 271 UNAMID peacekeepers (July 2007 till present) were killed over 141 months (making it one of the longest missions).

As a result of a drastic increase in UN peacekeeper casualties the United Nations, through the Secretary-General, produced a report titled ‘Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business’ in December 2017 to explain the problems peacekeepers face on the ground followed by a number of recommendations. Under ‘defensive posture’ the report proposes that in order to “improve security, missions should identify threats to their security and take the initiative, using all the tactics, to neutralise or eliminate the threats. Missions should go where the threat is, in order to neutralise it. Missions should also push combat to the night, to take advantage of their superior technology. Waiting in a defensive posture only gives freedom to hostile forces to decide when, where and how to attack.” [30] The terms ‘neutralise’ and ‘eliminate’ contradicts earlier guidelines as presented in ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines’ in which the text read as follows (emphasis placed by the author): [31]

United Nations peacekeeping operation should only use force as a measure of last resort, when other methods of persuasion have been exhausted and an operation must always exercise restraint when doing so. The ultimate aim of the use of force is to influence and deter spoilers working against the peace process or seeking to harm civilians; and not to seek their military defeat. The use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation should always be calibrated in a precise, proportional and appropriate manner, within the principle of the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while sustaining consent for the mission and its mandate. In its use of force, a United Nations peacekeeping operation should always be mindful of the need for an early de-escalation of violence and a return to non-violent means of persuasion.



1. Figure Duration and fatalities by UN missions in Africa [29]

Through the increasing role of peacekeepers to enforce peace in active conflict areas, the term ‘peacekeepers’ might no longer be the most appropriate term to use where no peace is being monitored, followed by the traditional role of peacekeepers in the aftermath of conflict. Similar to a later section referring to the relationship between peacekeeping and radicalisation into violent extremist organisations, the concern is that action may have unforeseen medium- to long-term consequences associated with being drawn into insurgencies that are traditionally difficult to get out of.

AFRICAN UNION MISSIONS

Within the African Union (AU), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established in 2002 to take the lead in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. The overall objective is to provide collective security through responding to conflicts and crisis situations and provide early warning to prevent conflicts through relying on diplomacy. Its core functions are presented as “to conduct early warning and preventive diplomacy, facilitate peace-making, establish peace support operations and, in certain circumstances, recommend intervention in Member States to promote peace, security and stability. The PSC also works in support of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction as

well as humanitarian action and disaster management.” [32] Since its inception, it deployed the following peace support operations (PSOs), most of them in contexts, where the UN has been unable to deploy peacekeepers in a timely manner: the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the African Mission in Darfur (AMIS), the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES), the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), and the African-led International Support Mission to Central African Republic (MISCA); [33] and sanctioned others, for example the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) mission against Boko Haram. The AU is also a key strategic partner of the United Nations (UN) in its ability to deploy multidimensional Peace Support Operations (PSOs) that consist of military, police and civilian components. Increasingly, missions on the continent have been called upon to protect civilians, while getting involved in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in close partnership with the United Nations. Two of these types of operations are being conducted against Boko Haram in the broader Lake Chad region and the other against al-Shabaab in Somalia. Considering the longer deployment and personal experience, attention will be placed on AMISOM in Somalia with the focus on preventing and countering violent extremism within the broader counterinsurgency and counterterrorism debate.

MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE (MNJTF)

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) mission came into effect under the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) in response to the transnational reach of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region. The four countries directly affected by Boko Haram operations are Nigeria, Cameroon with Niger taking the lead, followed by Chad and Benin (the latter is not a member of the LCBC). The PSC endorsed the MNJTF mission on 25 November 2014 and authorised its deployment on 29 January 2015. MNJTF’s mandate calls for the mission to “create a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by the activities of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in order to significantly reduce violence against civilians and other abuses, including sexual- and gender-based violence. Furthermore to facilitate the implementation of overall stabilization programmes by the LCBC Member States and Benin in the affected areas, including the full restoration of state authority and the return of IDPs and refugees; and facilitate, within the limit of its capabilities, humanitarian operations and the delivery of assistance to the affected populations.” [34] MNJTF consists of 10,000 uniformed troops, as well as a civilian component, divided into four sectors each with its own headquarters namely Mora in Cameroon; Bagasola in Chad; Diffa in Niger; and Baga in Nigeria.[35]

AMISOM

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established by the PSC at its 69th meeting on 19 January 2007 and mandated to: ‘provide support to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in Somalia and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; and create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia.’

According to the initial ‘Status of Mission Agreement’ signed between the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic (TFG) and the African Union Commission ‘the mission element shall be drawn from AU Member States and shall number between 8,000 and 9,000 personnel (civilians inclusive).’[36] However, by the end of 2008, despite initial interest by several African states to contribute troops, AMISOM’s strength stood at 2,650 composed of one Burundian and two Ugandan battalions.[37]

Somalia was divided into sectors with a particular force component taking responsibility for that sector: Ugandan forces are responsible for Sector 1: Banadir and Lower Shabelle regions that include Mogadishu; Kenyan forces control the southern parts of Somalia or Sector 2: Middle and Lower Juba – in the border areas with Kenya; Ethiopian forces Section 3: Bay, Bakool and Gedo regions in the western part of Somalia; Djibouti, Sector 4 that includes Hiiraan and Galgaduud regions in the north and Burundi in Sector 5 or the Middle Shabelle region in the north-eastern part of Somalia. Kismayu became a sector on its own (Sector 6) in 2017.[38]


PEACEKEEPING IN THE BROADER COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE PREVENTION AND COMBATING OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM DEBATE

Mission success, especially when assessing its role in countering, but especially preventing violent extremism rests with the conduct of peacekeepers while on mission. In other words, it is not only ‘what is being done’, but more important ‘how it is being done’ that determines success. Starting with being trained and sufficiently prepared to deal with the actual threats and challenges while on mission will have a direct impact on the conduct of each peacekeeper on mission. Therefore, instead of focussing on the broader success of the entire mission to restore peace and stability in a country or area, in especially PVE it’s the conduct of each peacekeeper that has a direct impact. Peacekeepers represent the international community (United Nations), the continent (with reference to missions under the AU) or representatives of a particular country they are seconded from – considering although acting under one banner (AMISOM for example), force contributing countries operate in specific areas. Therefore, if a peacekeeper from example Kenya abuses their power or act outside the boundaries of the mission, those directly affected will have a negative perception of the mission overall but also the country they represent.

Since the inception of the AMISOM’s mission in Somalia following the intervention of Ethiopian forces the year before, forces were challenged with separating al-Shabaab fighters from ordinary Somalis. Starting with Ethiopian intervention in Somalia between December 2006 and January 2009 – and although not initially part of the AMISOM mission until January 2014 – Ethiopian forces set an example that others followed. Instead of protecting the Somali public, security forces increasingly targeted the civilian population, especially when responding to roadside IEDs (improvised explosive device). A common strategy was to start shooting indiscriminately at bystanders, often resulting in more civilian casualties than initially caused by the incident itself. For example, on 19 June 2007 in response to a roadside IED that resulted in the death of three Ethiopian soldiers, seven civilians were killed when soldiers indiscriminately opened fire and an undisclosed number of people were arrested ‘suspected of planning the device’. [39] In similar incidents a pattern emerged that especially Ethiopian security forces but also others part of AMISOM after an incident indiscriminately open fire on any person that moves or looks suspicious without

being questioned. For example, on 26 March 2014 following a roadside IED targeting an AMISOM armoured vehicle in Kismayu, AMISOM troops responded by opening fire that resulted in the death of one civilian and injuring three others.[40] Leaving ordinary Somalis with the reality that foreign forces that are supposed to ensure their long-term stability, pose a more direct threat than the ‘enemy’ (reference to al-Shabaab) that more often discriminately target security personnel and government officials.

On the other side of the debate, loosing soldiers on a regular basis will have a psychological impact on troops considering that between the inception of AMISOM in 2007 and 31 March 2019, AMISOM was targeted 767 times (based on the author’s own database of attacks). In contrast to the UN that keeps excellent record of casualties, AMISOM and troop-contributing countries had been extremely reluctant to provide accurate figures of soldiers being killed or injured. Whereas al-Shabaab is expected to overestimate casualties, AMISOM-contributing countries tend to under-report actual figures. From the above-mentioned 767 incidents reported in the media, Figure 2 provides insight into the type of attacks, identifying attacks against convoys through the use of firearms, combination attacks with roadside IEDs or SVBIED (suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device) had been a favourite of al-Shabaab followed by attacks against bases. Modus operandi in this type of attacks included the use of mortars fired from a distance to complex attacks involving the use of suicide bombers on foot and in vehicles in combination with other fighters. It is especially as a result of this strategy that AMISOM lost the most personnel in single attacks. For example, on 17 September 2009 in a suicide operation directed at AMISOM headquarters the deputy commander, Major General Juvenal Niyonguruza, who was about to complete his tour was killed while the force commander, General Nathan Mugisha, was among the wounded. The death toll was reported as nine peacekeepers and 15 others injured.[41] In another attack, on 26 June 2015, a suicide bomber detonated a SVBIED and assailants stormed an AMISOM base in Leego town, Bay region that resulted in the death of at least 70 people, including 20 assailants and 23 others were abducted in the attack.[42] In the most devastating attack, al-Shabaab managed to overrun an AMISOM (Kenya) base on 15 January 2016, when multiple suicide bombers in explosives-laden vehicles and on foot launched an attack in El-Ade, Gedo region. At least 141 soldiers and an unknown number of assailants were killed, an unknown number of people were injured in the attack and at least five soldiers were abducted. [43] Despite these figures, the actual cost is unknown.



2. figure al-Shabaab target selection against AMISOM


Fighting a faceless enemy that draws its strength from the ability to disappear within ordinary public resulted in many armed forces throughout history asking ‘how to respond?’ Separating strategic from emotional responses remains challenging. On a human level, it is understandable that frustrated soldiers want to take revenge, yet it is the least appropriate response, in addition to its being illegal and counterproductive. By retaliating or indiscriminately attacking civilians, those fighting to restore stability will increasingly be considered as an occupying force – the enemy. In other words, becoming not only more unpopular, this strategy will also play into the hands of the opposing side – the ‘insurgents’ or ‘terrorists’. In other words, success will not only be measured by a decrease in the number of attacks, the winning of territory, or the level of security, but rather the willingness of people to join the organisation, in this case, al-Shabaab. Strategies that include the indiscriminate killing of civilians, collective punishment and other human rights abuses will only benefit insurgent/terrorist organisations. On 23 March 2007 Abulbakar Mohammed Hassan alias Abu Yahia al-Libi released a video on the Internet in which he stated:

My patient brother Mujahideen in Somalia...you have to stick to the gang wars, because it is the longest of battles and...most suitable for small numbers and vulnerable fighters...Slam them with one raid after another, set ambushes against them, and shake their soil with land mines and shake their bases with suicide attacks and car bombs... The goal of your fight and the purpose of your Jihad is the expulsion of the occupier and his helpers and the establishment of an Islamic state in the land of Somalia.[44]

In a nutshell, the most important lesson so far is that an insurgency can only be won from the inside; through understanding why people join and support the organisation (al-Shabaab) and preventing people from getting involved in the conflict based on this information. To understand the impact the use of force had on the public, a number of interviews were conducted with al-Shabaab disengaged members. Considering the focus of this chapter, reference will only be made to key results. In the first sample in 2016, 228 interviews were conducted with al-Shabaab respondents across Somalia. This sample formed part of a study conducted by the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa in Addis Ababa titled: “The Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment”.

The majority of respondents referred to foreign intervention as the primary reason for al-Shabaab's existence. Furthermore, 58 percent of the respondents referred to neighbouring countries as the most prominent threat against Islam. Foreign intervention was not only a threat against Somalia (sparking nationalism), but also a threat against Islam in which AMISOM and Ethiopia were categorised as Crusaders (Christians) occupying a Muslim country.

In another study conducted by the Finn Church Aid in 2017, interviews were conducted with 52 low- and mid-ranking members of al-Shabaab (referred to as 'members') and 17 members within the organisation's leadership (referred to as 'leaders'). These results were not published till today. Determining the driving factors behind the decision to join al-Shabaab, respondents were asked to identify the emotion associated with their decision to join al-Shabaab (Figure 3). Whereas leaders specifically identified hate (43 percent) and anger (40 percent) as the two most prominent emotions associated with their decision to join Al-Shabaab, fear (35 percent) and hope (29 percent) were the most prominent amongst the sample representing ordinary al-Shabaab members.




3. figure Emotion at the time of joining

Establishing who and what these emotions were directed against, respondents were asked to establish the level of frustration they experienced, identify whom it was directed against and if something specifically happened that influenced their decision to join al-Shabaab. Answering the first question, 47 percent of leaders interviewed expressed extreme levels of frustration (between 8 and 10) that corresponded with strong emotions such as anger and hate. Resembling leaders interviewed, 23 percent of ordinary al-Shabaab respondents interviewed expressed extreme levels of frustration associated with 15 percent who identified hate and 13 per cent who referred to anger as the driving emotions associated with joining al-Shabaab.

Frustration was predominately directed against U.S. military intervention as 75 percent of leaders felt severe frustration at the US intervention; 50 percent expressed severe frustration against AMISOM and 56 percent rated their frustration against neighbouring countries as ‘major’. Additionally, the majority (71 percent) of leaders interviewed believed that al-Shabaab served the best interests of Muslims/Somalis, justifying their decision to join al-Shabaab.

Establishing whether a specific event ultimately facilitated recruitment into al-Shabaab (see Figure 4), most leaders were finally pushed to join al-Shabaab following AMISOM’s intervention into Somalia (27 percent), Somali government action (27 percent) and Ethiopian specific intervention (21 percent). Ordinary members interviewed were motivated by Ethiopian intervention (31 percent), Somali government action (24 percent) and AMISOM’s intervention (15 percent).



4. figure Catalyst for joining Al-Shabaab

Above data suggest that the decision to join al-Shabaab was mainly driven by foreign involvement in Somalia as well as Somali government action. The question however is that if Somali government forces in association with Ethiopian and AMISOM forces established a different approach towards the Somali public – starting with calling on Muslim countries to take the lead while approaching peace enforcement from a counterinsurgency perspective – would it not have prevented radicalisation and recruitment into al-Shabaab?

FUTURE OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

Earlier UN missions on the continent were conducted over a shorter period of time, with very specific mandates in conflicts where different parties took the first step towards a peaceful resolution. Since the UN and the AU started to focus more on intervention to enforce peace, the required tactics have changed that should rely on a pure counterinsurgency

approach. With this both troop-contributing countries as well as countries willing to fund these operations need to understand that this type of missions will not be over soon, nor will it be without substantial casualties. The latter will be a result of an attrition strategy insurgents or terrorists will deploy that will rely on drawing opponents out to commit abuses and gain public support as a consequence. If there is any doubt, foreign troops should not be deployed especially if the mission will violate sovereignty even if just the perception exists amongst the people of the receiving country. Intervening just to ensure regime security against the wishes of the majority of the public will equally not be worth the effort. From the position of the United States and decisions by the UN to reduce troop contributions and initiate withdrawal plans in both Somalia (with specific reference to AMISOM) as well as MONUSCO before initial mission objectives were achieved, will play into the hands of al-Shabaab in Somalia and a number of rebel groups in the DRC. At the same time, both the UN and AU will lose credibility amongst those affected by conflict, while sending a wrong signal to future actors bringing disarray and instability to achieve its objectives. Especially in the case of Somalia, measures need to be put in place in the formerly liberated areas to ensure security and maintain control over liberated areas. Establishing control needs to be followed up with providing safety and security but also serving the public through providing basic services that will make al-Shabaab a less attractive alternative. The public therefore needs to see and experience the benefits presented by the government, starting with the three most immediate needs: employment, education and security.

The United States of America contributes most to the UN peacekeeping budget by providing closely a third of its \$6.7 billion budget for the fiscal year July 2018 – June 2019. However, in December 2018 the United States through John Bolton, the National Security Adviser and Jim Mattis, the Defense Secretary indicated that the US was rethinking its role in UN peacekeeping missions across Africa. According to John Bolton, the US will no longer support ‘unproductive, unsuccessful and unaccountable UN peacekeeping missions.’[45] While European countries not only financially contribute to peacekeeping operations but also contribution through personnel and non-traditional sources should be encouraged. While China also started to get involved in peacekeeping on the continent, the interest of China (as with other contributing countries) is always high on the agenda. It will therefore be necessary to act with the best interest of the affected country and its public in mind, namely establishing peace and security.

Following the decision of the UN Security Council on 29 March 2019 to renew the mandate of MONUSCO until 20 December 2019 the mission was tasked with two priorities: the submission of an independent strategic review of the UN Mission in the DRC, which will include ‘a phased, progressive and comprehensive withdrawal plan by 20 October 2019; and secondly that MONUSCO transfer its tasks to the Congolese Government and the UN country team, that will allow the Mission to leave the country under satisfactory circumstances in accordance with a responsible and favourable withdrawal plan.[46]

ENHANCING THE SUCCESS OF FUTURE PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN AFRICA


Approaching peacekeeping following the basic principles of a counterinsurgency will bring forth the following: since injuries and deaths among the civilian population will hurt the overall objective of a counterinsurgency, namely winning the hearts and minds of

the public; indiscriminate shooting is regarded as the most ineffective tactic. Instead, fire-power should only be directed at insurgents, especially in an urban setting. This will be in line with the ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines’: “The use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation should always be calibrated in a *precise, proportional and appropriate manner*, within the principle of the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect.” [31]

Secondly, intelligence is critical in any operation and should also be in peacekeeping. Without proactive intelligence, the element of surprise will be on the side of insurgents. This is in line with the new thinking on how to conduct peacekeeping in the future as published in 2017: “To prevent casualties, peacekeeping missions need tactical intelligence. Missions must be able to transform intelligence into simple tasks and actions that boost security but they often fail to do this. Missions do not lack high-tech resources to collect intelligence. They lack the basics, especially human intelligence, networks of informants, situational awareness, and capacity to communicate with the population.” [47]

Thirdly, the party that wins legitimacy will win the insurgency. Defeating the enemy militarily will only ensure a short-term victory. Instead, citizens’ trust in the government needs to be restored and that cannot be achieved through force. In essence, the majority of the population should want those in governing positions – at all levels – to be in those positions. Ensuring and enhancing legitimacy involve all sectors of government, because the inability to provide basic services, employment opportunities, education and healthcare will be exploited in favor of a revolt, insurgency and terrorism. The overall objective of a counterinsurgency effort is to re-establish order and security so that a society can function properly. To enhance overall legitimacy the following should be implemented as soon as possible: security operations need to move from combat operations to law enforcement – calling for a rethinking of the ratio between the military and police as presented in Figure 5 that presents the deployment of troop and police in MINUSCA (CAR), MINUSMA (Mali), MONUSCO (DRC), UNAMID (Darfur) and UNMISS (South Sudan). Accepting that every mission will require a different ratio between the military and police, when the military establish control, the police take over control (still supported by the military with its force superiority). Furthermore, insurgents should be categorised as ‘criminals’ that will require rebuilding the capacity of the police, judiciary and penal facilities to establish the rule of law. Soldiers and peacekeepers need to keep accurate records of all actions taken against insurgents, including record of offences committed by insurgents. These records can be used in subsequent court proceedings, but for this to be possible; soldiers should be taught the basic principles in the collection of evidence and how to maintain the chain of evidence.

Lastly, peacekeeping as well as counterinsurgency require patience. Instead of declaring victory following periods of calm, force commanders need to remember that the strength of insurgents rest in their ability to strike when they choose and periods of calm should rather be interpreted as a sign of the enemy regrouping to plan future attacks. Special attention should be directed to not getting trapped in a false sense of security.



5. figure Police and Military Deployment

CONCLUSION

Peacekeeping has changed over time and with it came the need to approach peacekeeping operations from a different perspective, especially since missions are being deployed while hostilities are ongoing and called upon to assist the government of the day to remain in power and protect civilians. Consequently, being confronted with terrorism and insurgencies, peacekeeping doctrines also need to change. The most effective solution is to approach peacekeeping from a counterinsurgency perspective. To illustrate this case in point, the chapter earlier presented AMISOM's contradictory relationship with the Somali public. On the one hand, AMISOM was mandated to protect civilians and provide humanitarian assistance. Consequently, AMISOM forces through its action was increasingly perceived as an occupying force that manifested itself through indiscriminate fire practices and the targeting of civilians that look suspicious without closer investigations. Consequently, instead of winning hearts and minds, AMISOM was nothing better than al-Shabaab in some areas. Therefore, instead of creating an atmosphere that will bring an end to the conflict, some Somalis rather opted to join al-Shabaab. However, through understanding how insurgencies work, a more strategic approach could have been adopted not to play into the hands of al-Shabaab to facilitate radicalisation and recruitment.

Within a counterinsurgency framework, future peacekeeping operations should also consider a larger police presence depending on the specific phase of the conflict. However, for these missions to be successful, peacekeepers in the future need to be trained in counterinsurgency with all involved, understanding the consequences of the excessive use of force. Instead of deploying a larger force that is undertrained and not equipped, a smaller highly trained force will be more effective in achieving its objectives. This will also become a requirement from a financial point of view considering the decreasing UN budget.

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