NATO – THE STEPS OF ADAPTATION │ NATO - AZ ADAPTÁCIÓ LÉPCSŐFOKAI

KARTALI Gabriella[1] – SEPRÉNYI Patrik[2]

Abstract

The rapid recognition and analysis of changes in the international environment and the development of res-ponses to the resulting challenges, the implementation of the appropriate adaptation process, is such an important act for NATO that failure or delay would lead to question the organization's raison d'être. Therefore, NATO periodically reviews its own strategic directions, analyzes and evaluates the changes in the security environment, and then, it renews or replaces its strategic directions, and designates the operational framework of the Alliance for the coming period, if necessary. In the last decade, many new challanges have appeared on NATO's horizon to which the organization had not previously paid sufficient attention, therefore nowadays, the Alliance is taking another step on the path of adaptation with its 8th strategic concept.

Absztrakt

A nemzetközi térben beállt változások gyors felismerése, elemzése és ezek következtében megjelenő kihívásokra adott válaszlépések kidolgozása, a megfelelő adaptációs folyamat lefolytatása olyan jelentőségű mozzanat a NATO esetében, melynek elmulasztása vagy halogatása a szervezet létjogosultságának, megkérdőjelezéséhez vezetne. Ezért a NATO időről-időre felülvizsgálja saját stratégiai irányait, elemzi és értékeli a biztonsági környezetben beállt változásokat, és amennyiben szükséges, megújítja vagy lecseréli stratégiai irányvonalait, és kijelöli a Szövetség működési kereteit az elkövetkezendő időszakra. Az elmúlt évtizedben számos olyan kihívás jelent meg a NATO horizontján, melyekre korábban nem fordított elegendő figyelmet és amelyek következtében a NATO jelenleg ismét az adaptáció újabb lépcsőfokán áll a 8. stratégiai koncepciójával.

Keywords

International security, NATO, strategic concept, new challenges, adaptation, Russia, China

Kulcsszavak

Nemzetközi biztonság, NATO, stratégiai koncepció, új kihívások, adaptáció, Oroszország, Kína

[1] kartali.gabriella@uni-obuda.hu | ORCID: 0009-0000-2957-8269 | PhD student, Óbuda University Doctoral School on Safety and Security Science | PhD hallgató, Óbudai Egyetem Biztonságtudományi Doktori Iskola
[2] patrik.seprenyi@gmail.com | ORCID: 0000-0003-1223-4245 | PhD Student, Doctoral School of Military Sciences, University of Public Service | PhD Hallgató, Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem, Hadtudományi Doktori Iskola

INTRODUCTION

"The history of mankind is the history of war"[1] The saying attributed to the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston Churchill, is unfortunately still a useful quote today, since after his death on January 24, 1965, many wars broke out that Churchill could no longer live through, such as the Soviet Union's war in Afghanistan, the wars in Iraq , the Yugoslavic wars, the African wars of the 1990s and 2000s, which in total claimed millions of victims, the war on terrorism, the consequences of the Arab Spring, and the currently most watched Russian-Ukrainian war, which Russia refers to as a special military operation.[2]

Therefore, despite the fact that the European continent has been relatively peaceful, i.e. mostly free of classical conventional war, for nearly 80 years since the end of the Second World War, it does not mean that this phenomenon has disappeared from the world, and above all, it does not mean that this type of threat may not occur again for European states in the future. And as a colletcive defence organization, the main task of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is precisely to prevent and deter international actors outside the organization from the idea of a possible external armed attack and to protect the security of its member states, the freedom of their peoples, democracy and the rule of law within the organization.[3]

Since the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, as the organization was left without an enemy, NATO increasingly shifted from direct collective defence tasks to crisis management and stability projecting tasks. This is also reflected in the organization's previous, 2010 strategic concept, which describes in the chapter "Basic tasks and principles"[4] that although collective defence remains a priority task, a conventional attack against NATO member countries is highly unlikely. At the same time, the events of the 2010s and the war that broke out in February 2022 highlighted that the resolutions of that strategic concept must be reviewed and updated in several respects, and that the collective defence nature of the organization along with the unity of the member states may be more important, than at any time in the last three decades. As a result, the eighth strategic concept, which the member states adopted at the 2022 summit in Madrid, puts the emphasis back on collective defense. [5]

ADAPTATION PROCESSES IN THE ORGANIZATION

NATO's role in the world

In order to understand why it is extremely important to talk about the need for NATO's further development, it is worth devoting a few sentences to illustrate the importance of the organization and its role in the international environment.

NATO was established on April 4, 1949 with the signing of the organization's foundation document, the 14-article North Atlantic Treaty, also known as the Washington Treaty. The organization, which had only 12 member states at the time, now includes 30 countries, and Finland and Sweden, by giving up their independent status and submitting their membership applications, opened up the possibility for NATO to expand to a 32-member organization in a short time, although Turkey gave a clear signal that it would not participate to support the accession of the two candidate countries, which represents a serious obstacle,

since accession can only take place with the unanimous decision and consensus of the NATO member states. [6]

The creation of NATO was primarily induced by the prevention of another large-scale, extensive war in Europe, the Western European fear of the restrengthening of Germany, and the opposition to the Soviet Union. [7]

After the Second World War, the Soviet Union and the West became increasingly estranged from each other, one of the important moments of this is, for example, Winston Churchill's Fulton speech on March 5, 1946 about the lowering of the Iron Curtain [8] that divided Europe into Western and Eastern parts or the foreign policy guideline drawn up by Harry S. Truman, the President of the United States in 1947, according to which the United States does not tolerate violent changes to the status quo on the one hand, and on the other hand provides assistance to countries where communism is at risk of gaining ground.[9]

The gradual alienation and the long-term security needs of the Western European states finally, shortly after the 1948 Treaty of Brussels and the Vandenberg Resolution [10] led to the establishment of NATO, the goals of which the organization's first secretary, Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, stated that the purpose of NATO is nothing more than to "keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." [11]

NATO was thus created as a defence organization that prevents wars, and is able to counterbalance the Soviet Union and later the Warsaw Pact, and as an organization which can exercise its collective self-defence rights, (written in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty [12] -, based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter on legitimate individual and collective self-defence) [13], NATO member states, in the sense of collective (self) defence, agree that an armed attack against one or more of them, in Europe or North America, will be considered as an attack against all of them, and in this way they will help each other to restore peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region. [14]

The main honour of NATO, which determines its role in the international environment, is that it connects North America with Europe, which creates a strong Euro-Atlantic defence cooperation that is complemented by many partner countries (for example, Japan or Australia among the global partners), with whom, in the spirit of cooperative security, the organization works together to overcome several different challenges occurring in the security environment.[15]

Nevertheless, NATO's goals and tasks have expanded significantly over the past seven decades, for example with crisis management tasks, handling problems that go beyond the borders of the organization but directly or indirectly affecting the member states, as well as a broader interpretation of security that goes beyond the military dimension, therefore it is no exaggeration to say that the history of NATO is actually a history of continuous adaptation to a dynamically changing security environment. This continuous adaptation however helped the organization to successfully survive different crisis periods and was able to maintain its raison d'etre in situations such as the beginning of the nineties, when with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the NATO was practically left without enemies.

In my opinion, one of the famous comparisons of the ancient Chinese philosopher and general, Sun Tzu, can be paralleled with NATO's adaptation processes, according to which the shape of the army (and there, the shape of the NATO) should be likened to water: it should always be flexible and have the ability to adapt to unexpected situations. [16]

With similar flexibility, NATO tries to continuously adapt to the changing security environment, in which the strategic concepts serving as a strategic compass play a key element.

NATO's strategic concepts

NATO's strategic concepts are the clearest impressions of the organization's adaptation steps. From such a concept, together with the 2022 concept, which is currently in force, a total of eight pieces were created during the history of NATO, four of which were created during the Cold War (1949-50, 1952, 1957, 1967), three in the post-bipolar era (1991, 1999, 2010) [17] and I separate the new, 2022 concept from the previous ones because it may indicate a new, so called multipolar era, which term is frquently used nowadays not only by the security policy experts, but also by governments too. A good example for that is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) whose member states, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, India and Pakistan reaffirmed their commitment to new multipolar world order. [18]

The strategic concepts, as I mentioned earlier, serve as a kind of strategic compass for the organization, which analyzes the characteristics and challenges of the current security environment, determines the organization's nature and tasks and the longer-term goals which are valid for about a decade in advance, It also provides guidelines regarding the organization and the application of forces, on the basis of which the various capacity development plans of the organization can be compiled. Concepts are therefore extremely important documents, and it is no coincidence that the four concepts adopted during the Cold War, together with their supplementary documents, were not made public for a long time. Today, however, they are also available on the Internet, and by comparing the concepts, NATO's direction of its development can be well visualised.

Concepts of the Cold War

The concepts of the Cold War placed an extremely high emphasis on the nuclear deterrence, which is still a main pillar of the organization to this day, however during the Cold War period, these capabilities (the nuclear triad – strategic bomber aircraft, land-based missiles, ballistis missile submarines) were given a much stronger role.[19] The first and second strategic concepts (1949, 1952), for example, between which documents only a little bit more than two years have passed, explain in detail the way of carrying out strategic bombings and the importance of supporting them with all means. Interestingly, although the United States provided the main defense umbrella for Europe, the two documents placed great emphasis on the ground forces of European countries whose main task was to hold the enemy forces until the Alliance's reinforcements arrive. [20]

Earlier it was stated that a strategic concept plans a decade in advance, here on the other hand, it is seen that a new concept was adopted in just a couple of years. The brevity of the period between the first two concepts can be justified by significant changes affecting the organization, which required updating the concept that had just been created. Such changes were the accession of Greece and Turkey in 1952, the establishment of the integrated military command system, the appointment of the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in the person of General Dwight D. Eisenhower (the 34th president of the United States, 1953-1961) [21], the start of infrastructural developments, and a not negligible event, the outbreak of the Korean War. This shows perfectly, how the NATO could react

and adopt to the dynamically changing security environment and today, the organization is trying to keep this ability as functioning as it was always.

Not so long after the second strategic concept (1952), which was similar in content to the first document, the third strategic concept was adopted in 1957, which is usually called the concept of mass retaliation, which comes from the Eisenhower administration.[22] This concept has already openly stated the primary role of weapons of mass destruction in NATO's strategy, which meant that the organization must be able to survive the attacks of a state or states acting as an aggressor against it, and then with all available means, including weapons of mass destruction, to retaliate in the most destructive way.[23]

Such a high degree of reliance on nuclear weapons can also be attributed to the fact that, in terms of conventional forces, NATO never had any deterrent power, which can successfully scare away a possible soviet aggression and also, the organization would never have been capable of larger-scale offensive operations guaranteeing success, which also proves, that NATO is not an offensive, but a defensive organization which can also be read in the North Atlantic Treaty.[24]

 As a result of the increase in the Soviet Union's nuclear capability however, the concept of mass retaliation had a strong negative impact already in 1957, because the security policy experts, military officers, generals, diplomats, politicians all realized that this way of thinking would lead to mutual assured destruction (MAD), which almost really happened in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis and therefore the NATO member states had to find a new approach.[25]

It only took a few years after the Crisis, for a new concept to emerge, which document abolished the principle of mass retaliation and changed the orientation tot he principle known as flexible response. In 1968, the concept of Flexible Response, which strikes a lighter tone, was accepted as a result of Pierre Harmel, Belgian foreign minister's 1967 report which emphasized the role of political communication, and as he wrote, in addition to maintain the deterrent capability, it is also important to devote space to the political dimension. [26] The strategy of the organization had been softened with regard to nuclear weapons, because instead of the previous immediate retaliation with weapons of mass destruction, a multi-stage reaction principle had come into focus, the essence of which is that the enemy considering an attack against the organization cannot calculate the level of the expected escalation of the conflict that breaks out. The organization could respond with forces of the same size, with forces larger than the size of the attacking forces, or with nuclear weapons.[27] The concept can be said to be successful, so it is no coincidence that after adopting this concept, it is replaced only by the first post-Cold War strategic concept (1991), which is also the first public concept.

Summarizing the years of the Cold War, eighteen after its birth, NATO came to the point where it recognized the importance of political communication in addition to military factors, which meant that the Alliance's portfolio began to expand and deepen. Although, the nuclear deterrence and the collective defense remained the dominant factors throughout the Cold War, the softer tools started to come to the surface. It is quite interesting though, that the Soviet Union considered the changes of NATO's strategic directions as a success of its own deterrent capabilites.

Concepts of the post-bipolar age

The end of the Cold War appeared as a serious crisis for NATO, since with the end of hostilities, the organization practically lost its „raison d'être" (right to exist), as a result of which the necessity of its existence was questioned and if the Alliance wanted to remain relevant, it had to find its new identity in the new era.

However, NATO remained true to its excellent adaptation capabilities and managed to find its place and role after the Cold War, which role was nothing more than the preservation and the projection of stability, since the new world order seemed to bring instability, especially in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. In Eastern Europe, countries like the Baltic states, Poland, Hungary etc. turned towards Euro-Atlantic integration which required NATO and EU to revise their approaches to the region(s).[28]

Besides the integration processes, a series of ethnic conflicts broke out in the Balkan region which led to mass killing amond ethnic Serbians, Croatians, Bosnian Muslims, and Kosovo Albanians as Yugoslavia broke apart step by step. Since the conflitcs could have a major impact on the European economy and stability, the region attracted the NATO's attention too and to this day, maintaining the fragile stability of the region is a priority for the organization.[29]

After the realization of the unstable and fragile environment, the projection of stability became one of the main tasks of NATO which helped the organization to find its new identity. Later on in the nineties, it became more clear, that crisis management and the „out of area" (beyond NATO's „borders") operations were now among the Alliance's core tasks, as it is written in the 1999 Strategic Concept.[30] The projection of stability appears as a task that is still decisive to this day, and which also induced the creation of such partnerships as, for example, the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Mediterranean Dialogue or the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Besides the projection of stability, the European continent was also extremely important to the United States because of the further maintenance of good transatlantic relations, disarmament and arms limitation processes and military cooperation.[31]

In conclusion, NATO's predictions about the importance of the role of out of area operations, crisis management, and stability projection turned out to be true and the NATO successfully found its role in the new world order and based on the experiences of the decade and the integration processes of the Eastern countries that wanted to join the organization, the strategic concept of 1999 was adopted, which concept placed great emphasis on the threats of religious-ethnic conflicts, on cooperation with partner countries, and on the progress of European integration processes, so on the experiences of the nineties.[32]

The only problem with the concept was that it did not take sufficient account of problems such as terrorism, which later will receive sufficient attention, but only after the disastrous terrorist attacks in New York in 2001.

We have therefore arrived at the strategic concept that was in effect untin 2022, which was adopted by the organization in 2010. The concept with the subtitle "Active role, Modern defence" presents the challenges affecting the organization in a very extensive interpretation of security, which thus greatly contributes to the expansion of NATO's world view and tasks. This concept shows terrorism as an extremely important challenge, the challenges of information operations in cyberspace, and also shows several different challenges

in the field of human security, such as climate change or energy security. The important role of civil-military cooperation during crisis management is also shown.[33]

This brings us to the most important point of the study, namely to examine what new challenges have appeared since 2010, which NATO has to face both now and in the future, and which made the 2010 concept outdated. The next chapter therefore focuses on new types of challenges from NATO's point of view.

NEW CHALLENGES

Hybrid and cyber threats

One of the most important challenges, which more and more relevant in the 2010s, are the threats appearing in cyberspace, which are closely related to another, equally challenging phenomenon, hybrid threats. Basically, both the amazingly fast pace of technological development and the globalization process contributes to the growth of the role of both phenomena, since the technological development has resulted in a closer connection of the countries of the world, strengthening the interdependence. Nowadays, the key social systems and activities are organized around electronic information networks, which are exceptionally vulnerable. Reliance on information networks and exposure to the Internet serve as just the right basis for modern information warfare and the aforementioned hybrid threats or warfare.[34]

Hybrid warfare is a controversial concept, the development of which is linked to Valery Gerasimov, the Russian military leader, and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, although Gerasimov did not use the term hybrid warfare in the article he wrote, it was rather spread among experts from Western countries away.[35]

The essence of this form of warfare is the combined use of soft, medium and hard tools of traditional and irregular warfare elements, as well as a form of interest enforcement where the interest of the attacker is to keep the given conflict below the threshold value and to avoid escalation, i.e. to keep the conflict in the gray zone.[36]

A common example of this type of conflict is the South China Sea dispute, where the parties involved, such as the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, and even the United States, try to force the opposing party to back down with frequent cyber attacks, demonstrations of naval power, and diplomatic tools, for example Nancy Pelosi's, the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, visit to Taiwan (Republic of China) on August 2, 2022. This event stirred up a lot of dust and The People's Republic of China reacted aggressively. In the period following the visit, the People's Liberation Army launched ballistic missiles, conducted combined maneuvers in airspace and waters surrounding Taiwan. [37] China even released a white paper on Taiwan question which focuses on the future reunification in the new era.[38]

One of the key elements of these hybrid threats is cyberspace, which provides space for various information operations and which was declared an operational area by NATO at the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw.[39]

Cyberspace, which means the totality of information systems and the information flowing through them, creates a perfect opportunity to carry out hybrid operations. On the one hand, the information and disinformation operations launched here are capable of disrupting internally the target country's society, turning it against the government, and driving

it into a panic, for example through fake news, which weakens the internal stability of the given country or organization, and on the other hand, such a serious attack can be launched in the information space, for example, against critical infrastructures, as a result of which entire countries and groups of countries can be paralyzed, for example in terms of energy supply or telecommunications equipment, and even the IT systems of the armed forces can be disabled through cyberspace, which can thus make a country vulnerable to a possible armed attack from the outside.[40]

Overall, therefore, in relation to hybrid and cyber threats, these challenges are challenges that NATO should pay particular attention to and as it is clear now, the Alliance is definitely trying to improve its capabilites to maintain security and stability.

NATO-Russia relations

The 2010 strategic concept in relation to Russia speaks of a strategic partnership, the need to strengthen cooperation, but also about the troubled relations. Based on the document, the Alliance does not mean a threat to Russia, but at the same time, an important NATO principle also found in the text, according to which any European democracy that shares the Alliance's values can join the Alliance, results in a serious conflict of interests between NATO and Russia, since, as the Russian President Vladimir Putin also stated in his speech on February 21, 2022, that the expansion of the Alliance towards the East presents itself as a security threat on Russia's side. [41]

After the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, China also stated that NATO countries should have thought before pushing a large country like Russia to the wall. At the same time however, calling the invasion as preventive self-defence is at least as unacceptable on the part of Russia in connection with the attack of Ukraine, as it was not acceptable in the case of the United States' war in Iraq.

According to international law, violence may only be used in individual or collective self-defense, in case of the occurrence of an armed attack or the authorization of the UN Security Council.[42] Russia was not hit by an armed attack, and the areas it wants to defend (Donetsk and Luhansk) are not recognized states, so the reference to the right of individual or collective self-defense is not valid. The authorization of the UN Security Council (SC) could possibly have arisen if Russia turned to the SC with accusations of genocide and after the investigation it decides on the possible necessary non-armed or armed regulations, but Russia did not turn to the SC, so overall the Russian intervention is nothing more than illegal intervention in the internal affairs of another state, or aggression. [43]

The annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and the invasion since February 2022 resulted in a very serious deterioration in the relationship between NATO and Russia. Since 2014, the organization has suspended all serious civil and military cooperation with Russia, deeply condemned the Russian aggression in 2022 and expressed its solidarity with Ukraine, athough the diplomatic channels are maintained with Russia in order to find a constructive solution to the situation. The attitude towards Russia is clearly one of, if not the most decisive issue to which NATO must concentrate on in the upcoming times.[44]

The Rise of China

In addition to the Russian threat, a new challenger appeared, especially in the 2010s, which is most relevant from the point of view of the United States, since the two states are

competing for the leading position in the world economy, and the United States is trying to assert its interests within the framework of NATO too.

Since the Second World War, the United States has practically been the protective umbrella for Europe to keep threats at bay, and in this way it is not surprising if the strategic interests of the States also appear at European negotiating tables. According tot he interests, while the goal of the United States is to maintain the post-Cold War unipolar world order and its own hegemony, China's goal is to restore the country's pre-19th century greatness and at the same time emphasize the multipolar world order.[45]

Today, as a result of the Reform and Opening up policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, the People's Republic of China has undergone enormous economic, military and technological development. China's GDP increased more than seventy times in 40 years, from USD 200 billion to USD 17,500.[46] Nowadays, China is often called as the workshop of the world, but at the same time, it is important to take into account that as a result of the many resources invested in research and development, China is already capable of producing high-tech products independently. The large-scale economic development was noticed by other states, including the United States, so it is no coincidence that in the early 2000s, the so-called Chinese threat theory appeared, according to which China pursues a world-conquering policy, the aim of which is to extend its own influence and power to as many parts of the world as possible, for example, with the tools of debt trap diplomacy.[47]

The Belt and Road Initiative, launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013 is most often associated with this theory, which is a huge-scale infrastructural investment and development program designed to build connections between Europe, Africa and Asia and asa result, to disconnect the European continent from the American continent economically, therefore it is not surprising that at the 2019 NATO summit in London the relationship with China was referred to as opportunities and challenges. The report prepared by the group NATO 2030: United for a New Era 2020 led by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg clearly characterizes it as a threat to democratic states.[48]

NATO'S RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGES - CONCLUSION

In the decade following the 2010 strategic concept, the most visible change in NATO's operation is the gradual strengthening of the collective defense nature, as well as the gradual deterioration of the dynamically changing international security environment in general. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a key element in these changes, which significantly increased the sense of threat in Europe, as a result of which the NATO summit in Wales in 2014 redirected the organization towards the tasks according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Accordingly, NATO returned to regular military exercises, the cooperation of special operations forces and the federal level coordination of intelligence and surveillance came to fore. The Alliance also adopted the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), which focuses on the defense of the Alliance's eastern borders and which includes the installation of military equipment and bases.

As part of the plan, the number of NATO Response Forces was increased from 13,000 to 40,000 people (now the goal is to reach 300 000) [49], and a very rapid response force group of 4,000 people was also created. Last but not least, the power of Article 5 was extended to cyber defense, and the member states accepted the recommendation of a 2% approach to defense expenditure in proportion to GDP. [50]

At the next summit, in 2016, in Warsaw, the strengthening of collective defense continued and NATO deployed four battalion battle groups (4,000 people) in the territory of Poland and the Baltic States with a "forward rotational presence" and declared cyberspace as an operational area, and at the same time the Very Rapid Reaction Combined Forces were also increased to 15,000. Since 2016, unity and cooperation between member states has also become increasingly important, since it is difficult to react effectively to any threat without a unified collective action. An important element of this was the establishment of the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) in 2017, which is a result of NATO-EU cooperation and which institution's task is to analyse the incoming cyber attacks from Russia and the disinformation operations, as well as the development of common and effective responses to challenges.[51]

Last but not least, this article has arrived to reflect to the NATO Strategic Concept 2022, which can be seen as a result of the last deacede and an organized collection of the emerged threats and the possible reactions to them. The document states, that Euro-Atlantic security is undermined by instability and strategic competition, where the Russian's Federation war of aggression against Ukraine is the most threatening event, because it shatters the peace of the continent. Despite the fact, that Russia's actions are condemned, in the concept NATO states, that the organization does not seek the confrontation with Russia and is ready to talk to prevent escalation.[52] According to the escalation, though NATO collectively does not take part in the conflict, the members of the organization separately help Ukraine with humanitarian aid, armored vehicles, anti-tank weapons, ammuniton, mobile multiple rocket launcher systems and even main battle tanks, and as a result it is not surprising that the Russian and Chinese news are talking about a war between Russia and NATO.

According to the People's Republic od China (PRC) and the hybrid threats, they also appear in the new strategic document and in additon, these two challanges are strongly connected, since the concept refers to the hybrid and cyber threats as issues which also come from the direction of the PRC which is trying to expand its influence around the world and is trying to subvert the rules-based international order.[53]

Therefore, based on the trends of the 2010s and the 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO is increasingly returning to the collective defense needs that led to the creation of the organization, while at the same time it is trying to properly adapt to other new serious challenges, such as hybrid and cyber threats, energy security and security of supply, economic and technological competition with China, threats from Russia, and ever-increasing challenges such as pandemics and climate change. It should also be noted that NATO no longer concentrates only on defense, but it emphasizes the significance of the deterrence too.[54]

In conclusion, NATO is not in an easy situation since the security environment is constantly changing and it seems that the next decade will be tougher than the three decades after the dissoluiton of the Soviet Union and maybe even tougher than the Cold War.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1]   M. Ashley, "Churchill and History", International Affairs, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 89, 1966.

[2]   President of the Russian Federation, "Address by the President of the Russian Federation," The Kremlin, Moscow, Feb. 24, 2022. Available: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843. (Accessed Feb. 1, 2023).

[3]   North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The North Atlantic Treaty," Washington, D.C., Apr. 4, 1949. Available: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm. (Accessed Feb. 21, 2023).

[4]   North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 2010," Available: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_82705.htm. (Accessed Feb. 21, 2023).

[5]   North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept," Available: https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/. (Accessed Feb. 21, 2023).

[6]   Reuters, "Explainer: Why is Turkey blocking Sweden and Finland NATO membership?", Available: https://www.reuters.com/world/why-is-turkey-blocking-swedish-finnish-nato-membership-2023-01-25/. (Accessed Feb. 16, 2023).

[7]   North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Why was NATO founded?", Available: https://www.nato.int/wearenato/why-was-nato-founded.html. (Accessed Feb. 16, 2023).

[8]   Winston Churchill, "Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech", Available: https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/. (Accessed Feb. 16, 2023).

[9]   H. S. Truman, "Truman Doctrine," Mar. 12, 1947. Available: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp. (Accessed Feb. 17, 2023).

[10] U.S. Senate, "Vandenberg resolution. U.S. Senate Resolution 239. 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 11th June 1948 (The Vandenberg Resolution)", Available: https://www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/declassified/doc_files/Vandenberg%20resolution.pdf. (Accessed Feb. 17, 2023).

[11] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Origins: NATO Leaders", Available: https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/declassified_137930.htm. (Accessed Feb. 17, 2023).

[12] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The North Atlantic Treaty", Washington, D.C., Apr. 4, 1949. Available: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm. (Accessed Feb. 21, 2023).

[13] United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations", 1945.

[14] The North Atlantic Treaty. Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949.

[15] "Relations with partners across the globe", NATO, Feb. 17, 2023. Available: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49188.htm. (Accessed on: Feb. 20, 2023).

[16] Sun-Tzu, Art of War. Helikon, 2020.

[17] Strategic concepts", NATO, Feb. 20, 2023. Available: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm. (Accessed on: Feb. 20, 2023).

[18] I. Ahmad, "SCO summit reinforces global trend toward multipolarity," Arab News. Available: https://www.arabnews.com/node/2164911. (Accessed on: Feb. 20, 2023).

[19] U.S. Department of Defense, "America's Nuclear Triad", Available: https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/Americas-Nuclear-Triad/. (Accessed on: Feb. 20, 2023).

[20] DC 6/1 The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area 1 December 1949. Available: https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a491201a.pdf. (Accessed on: Feb. 20, 2023).

[21] "Dwight D. Eisenhower", The White House. Available: https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/dwight-d-eisenhower/. (Accessed on: Feb. 21, 2023).

[22] "Massive Retaliation", Britannica. Available: https://www.britannica.com/topic/nuclear-strategy/Massive-retaliation. (Accessed on: Feb. 21, 2023).

[23] MC 14/2 Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area, 23. May 1957. Available: https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a570523a.pdf. (Accessed on: Feb. 21, 2023).

[24] The North Atlantic Treaty. Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949. Available: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm. (Accessed on: Feb. 21, 2023).

[25] D. S. McDonough, "Nuclear Superiority or Mutually Assured Deterrence: The Development of the US Nuclear Deterrent", Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 811-823, 2005.

[26] "Harmel Report", NATO. Available: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67927.htm. (Accessed on: Feb. 22, 2023).

[27] MC 14/3 Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area, 16. January 1968. Available: https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a680116a.pdf. (Accessed on: Feb. 22, 2023).

[28] F. Gazdag, "A magyar külpolitika 1989-2014", Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem, 2014.

[29] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 2010", Available: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf. (Accessed: Feb. 22, 2023).

[30] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 1999", Available: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm. (Accessed: Feb. 22, 2023).

[31] L. R. Pfaltzgraff Jr., "NATO's Future Role: An American View", Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 176-186, 1991.

[32] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 1999."

[33] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 2010."

[34] Zs. Haig, Információs műveletek a kibertérben, Budapest: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2018.

[35] J. Tomolya, "A Geraszimov-cikk katonapolitikai háttere", DOI 10.17047/HAD-TUD.2019.29.1-2.74.

[36] Y. Hofstetter, „Láthatatlan háború – Avagy miképpen fenyegeti a digitalizáció a világ biztonságát és stabilitását", Budapes, Corvina Kiadó, 2020.

[37] M. T. Klare, "China Reacts Aggressively to Pelosi's Taiwan Visit", Arms Control Association, 2022. Available: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-09/news/china-reacts-aggressively-pelosis-taiwan-visit. (Accessed: Feb. 23, 2023).

[38] The State Council, "The People's Republic of China: China releases white paper on Taiwan question, reunification in new era", Available: https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202208/10/content_WS62f34f46c6d02e533532f0ac.html. (Accessed: Feb. 23, 2023).

[39] P. Tálas, "A varsói NATO-csúcs legfontosabb döntéseiről", Nemzet és Biztonság, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 97-101, 2016.

[40] Y. Hofstetter, „Láthatatlan háború – Avagy miképpen fenyegeti a digitalizáció a világ biztonságát és stabilitását", Budapest, Corvina Kiadó, 2020.

[41] V. Putin, "Address by the President of the Russian Federation", The Kremlin, Moscow, Feb. 24, 2022. Available: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843. (Accessed: Feb. 25, 20239.

[42] United Nations Charter. Available: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text (Accessed: Feb. 25, 2023).

[43] Definition of Aggression, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX). Available: http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/GAres3314.html (Accessed: Feb. 25, 2023).

[44] Relations with Russia. NATO. Available: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50090.htm (Accessed: Feb. 26, 2023).

[45] The People's Republic of China's 14th Five-Year Plan. Available: https://www.fujian.gov.cn/english/news/202108/t20210809_5665713.htm. (Accessed: Feb. 25, 2023).

[46] GDP - China. The World Bank. Available: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN. (Accessed: Feb. 25, 2023).

[47] K. Wang, "China: Is it burdening poor countries with unsustainable debt?", BBC, Nov. 30, 2021. Available: https://www.bbc.com/news/59585507. (Accessed: Feb. 25, 2023).

[48] "NATO 2030: United for a new era" Available: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf. (Accessed: Feb. 25, 2023).

[49] "NATO to hike number of soldiers on high alert from 40,000 to 300,000, says Stoltenberg", Euronews, Jun. 27, 2022. Available: https://www.euronews.com/2022/06/27/nato-to-hike-number-of-soldiers-on-high-alert-from-40000-to-300000-says-stoltenberg. (Accessed: Feb. 25, 2023).

[50] Z. Szenes, "Előre a múltba", A NATO Wales után", Külügyi Szemle, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 3-26, Fall 2014.

[51] "What is Hybrid CoE?", Hybrid CoE. Available: https://www.hybridcoe.fi/who-what-and-how/. (Accessed: Feb. 26, 2023).

[52] NATO 2022 Strategic Concept. Available: https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/. (Accessed: Feb. 25, 2023).

[53] NATO 2022 Strategic Concept. Available: https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/. (Accessed: Feb. 25, 2023).