

**INTERPRETATION OF SECURITY
IN RELATION TO THE CORONA-VIRUS
EPIDEMIC****A BIZTONSÁG ÉRTELMEZÉSE A
KORONAVÍRUS JÁRVÁNY KAPCSÁN**SZAKALI Miklós¹ – SZŰCS, Endre²**Abstract**

In this article, we would like to draw the attention for the importance of the comprehensive approach of security. The ongoing coronavirus epidemic has already proven that there is an equal need for the military and the non-military security sectors for coping with a complex crisis. From a national point of view, we consider inevitable the elaboration of a National Civil Security Strategy and its inclusion into the system of the national security strategies. We also suggest systematic and forward-looking planning of the civilian capabilities (critical infrastructure) in close coordination with the military capabilities. Finally, we propose a structural framework for the coordinated strategic planning.

Keywords

coronavirus, security, strategic planning, civil security, critical infrastructure

Absztrakt

A cikkben szeretnénk felhívni a figyelmet a biztonság komplex értelmezésének fontosságára. A koronavírus járvány bebizonyította, hogy a katonai és a nem-katonai biztonsági szektorokra egyaránt szükség van egy komplex válsághelyzet elhárításához. Nemzeti tekintetben elengedhetetlen egy Polgári Biztonsági Stratégia kidolgozása és beemelése a nemzeti biztonsági stratégiák rendszerébe. Javasoljuk a polgári képességek (kritikus infrastruktúra) fejlesztésének szisztematikus és előrelátó tervezését a katonai biztonsági szektorral összhangban végrehajtani és erre egy strukturális keretet ajánlunk.

Kulcsszavak

koronavírus, biztonság, stratégiai tervezés, civil biztonság, kritikus infrastruktúra

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INTRODUCTION

The world is at war, from China and to the United States, every nation is fighting in this particular war, in which not a single shot has been fired yet, but it has caused so much losses in human life, economic and social values that it can rightfully be measured against a devastating war conflict. The number of people infected with the new coronavirus is approaching to three million; death toll has exceeded 200,000, according to the daily report of the Johns Hopkins University (Index-I, 2020). These figures are just for information, since they significantly change from day to day. However, we should also be aware that the number of reported cases does not accurately reflect reality, since the protocol for testing and the criteria for accounting and reporting are different in each country.

In addition to human losses, the epidemic is also severely hit the economies throughout the world. Setback is already felt after the temporary shutdown of companies, and the negative trend may increase in the future if many production and service companies are unable to restart and contribute to the economic growth, which is essential for the recovery of economies in every country. Another serious consequence of the pandemic is that great number of masses lose their jobs and this “jump” in the rate of unemployment may generate social tensions and finally ending up in a social explosion. The new coronavirus pandemic could lead to the loss of nearly 25 million jobs worldwide, according to a report published by the International Labor Organization. The Geneva-based organization estimated that in the worst-case scenario, 24.7 million jobs could be lost. By comparison, according to the organization, this number is higher than the number of registered unemployed (22 million) in the economic crisis began in 2008. (Határátkelő, 2020)

The global epidemic was very ruthless with Europe as well; almost half of the infected people and 60-65% of death cases are coming from here, according to current data. In addition to the loss of human lives, life in Europe has completely changed, almost all the usual activities stopped, on individual and social levels too. The current situation is deteriorated by the fact that we do not know the “enemy”, the development of an efficient vaccine or antibody is now in an experimental stage, currently there is no generally proven medicine or professionally agreed protocol for treatment. In this way, of course, it is impossible to predict the end of the struggle, which may result growing public uncertainty and impatience, greatly reducing the tolerance against the restrictive rules. However, it is clear that the longer it takes to overcome the epidemic, the greater losses we can expect.

Among other sectors, Europe's leading economic sectors, which greatly contributed to the economic growth of Europe and the prosperity of individual nations, tourism and car manufacturing have also got to crisis. International and national traffic of passengers and together with it the tourism have also come to an almost complete halt, and as a result of it, the revenue coming from these sectors has almost fallen to zero. However, not only the tourism has collapsed, but its related services such as the hotel industry, restaurants, cafes and the entertainment industry are also struggling for survival. For example in Italy, the European center of the virus, nearly 128 million trips were registered each year, half of them made by foreign tourists. Foreigners spent nearly 50 billion EUR in the country in 2018, according to the estimation of the Bank of Italy. Now, with the absence of tourists, perhaps the weakest financial year ever will come in the Italian tourism. This is a great damage since the added value of the tourism is about six percentage of the Italian GDP. Therefore, this sector is more important for Italy than for example to France or Germany.

The European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) has made an estimate in its latest paper on how many workers could be affected by a forced break in each country, and how much reduction in the car production can be expected due to the coronavirus. They estimated that 1,087,293 workers would be affected by the outbreak of the epidemic in the EU, which were about 40% of the 2.6 million people directly employed in the car industry. The shutdown could be the most painful for Germany: affecting more than 568 thousand workers and decreasing the production with more than 359 thousand vehicles. (Portfolio, 2020) It is understandable that a leader of the Volkswagen's Board of Directors stated that the current situation could not last longer than this summer because neither society nor economy would be able to tolerate it. Germany, the strongest economy of the EU is already facing with serious problems, more than 470,000 German companies requested wage subsidies from the federal government due to the crisis. (Index-2, 2020) Volkswagen, Daimler, Puma, Deutsche Bank and several highly rated companies also applied for support as well as other mid-, and small companies. The German government is trying to mitigate the impact of the crisis with a 750 billion EUR financial package, which means that more than 21% of the German GDP in 2019 will be spent on crisis measures. Nations follow the same way in order to overcome the crisis and recover their economy as soon as possible, almost all European governments try to keep their economies alive and prevent national tragedy with economic rescue packages. It is clear that, the epidemic is not just a current threat affecting our present life, but it will certainly have a serious impact on our future, determining long-term safety and security of our life.

ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

Taking into consideration all of this, the role of international organizations can be considered, as they have a decisive role in forecasting the epidemic and in coordinating or leading the preparations against the crisis in time by developing unified responses, measures and proposals. On 22 January 2020, the Chinese authorities announced the closure of Wuhan, which was considered the center of epidemic in China; meanwhile, the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva announced that the spreading of the coronavirus could not be considered as an international health emergency. There is no doubt that the accuracy and the timeliness of information provided by some nations were questionable and these facts significantly hampered the recognition of the epidemic and the introduction of the necessary preventive measures. On 11 March 2020, after lengthy discussion, the WHO took a decision and declared "pandemic situation", at that time the chief of the WHO, Tedros Adaman Gebreesus was optimistic on the possibilities to control the epidemic. However, a few days later, on 25 March 2020, he already expressed in dramatic sentences how serious the situation is. "This virus is the public enemy number one. A month, two months ago, it would have been time for action ..." (Index-3, 2020)

At the time of the first Chinese reports, the epidemic was still considered in Brussels and most part of Europe as a distant risk factor. This confidence was because previous health threats such as SARS, Ebola or MERS had not spread and caused epidemic in Europe or worldwide. On 27 January 2020, the President of the German Centre of Epidemiology assessed that, single cases may occur in each country, but they were not expected to spread (Politico, 2020). Thus, EU leaders still spent February 2020 with global diplomacy. Even on 26 February 2020, the threat posed by the virus was assessed as "low to moderate" and

the focus remained on diplomatic relations with regions and countries outside the EU. The President of the EU Commission, von der Leyen met with leaders of the African Union in Ethiopia, the Commissioner for Health went to Rome and the Commissioner for Crisis Responses had a meeting in Burkina Faso. This was in line with the priority of the President, to lead an EU Commission which is more focused on geopolitics. Meanwhile, there has been a serious incident, a bomb attack killed more than thirty Turkish soldiers in Syria. As a consequence of it and referring to the increased burden on his country the Turkish president announced that he could not keep the refugees back from migrating into the EU and he would open the borders to Greece and Bulgaria. This announcement previewed the emergence of a refugee crisis that caused more headache for the EU leaders than the coronavirus. Thus, negotiations have been launched with stakeholders to address the potential refugee crisis, which diverted again the attention from the epidemic, while it silently spread and infected up and down in the EU.

NATO, as the guarantor of security in the Euro-Atlantic area, is a politico-military organization with the primary goal to protect against military threats. Therefore, it cannot be expected from this organisation to monitor and respond to a health epidemic situation. The Alliance primarily focuses on developing its military forces and capabilities, rather than building civilian/civil defense capabilities. Even in the framework of civilian preparedness, it expects nations to maintain and develop their civilian capabilities and may be required to support joint allied operations. NATO's reliance on civilian assets and services is a prerequisite for the success of Allied operations. In case of large-scale operations, almost 90% of military deliveries are made using civilian means provided by the civilian sector. More than 50% of military communications are carried out via civilian satellites and networks. The Host Nation Support (HNS) approx. 75% is provided by local commercial infrastructures and services. (Lasconjarias, 2017) After all, it is clear that NATO counts on the civilian capabilities of nations and not the other way around, the Alliance will not provide these capabilities to its members. In line with it, NATO does not even provide its members with prognosis on epidemics and preventive measures. It organized the health protection of personnel in close cooperation with the national regulations of the local authorities and the Allies.

INTERPRETATION OF SECURITY

This crisis caused by the emergence and spread of coronavirus should draw our attention to a systemic security problem. There are serious shortfalls in forecasting and preventing of crises. There was not any international organizations that could warn the European nations in time and could lead preventive actions in a coordinated way. The epidemic has ruined the security of countries, individuals as well as the security of societies and economies across Europe and all over the world. At present, the caused damage cannot be estimated, but we must be prepared for the extended and long-lasting impact of the crisis in the economic, social and political spheres worldwide. How could it happened that the attention of the developed Western-world has slipped over recognizing and preventing or slowing down a security threat of this magnitude? However, the question can continue, is it possible that the developed West is not prepared to deal with this type of non-military security threat? It seems that we have returned to the old approach of security (or not moved away from this point) which was defined after the World War II., and remained the base of the security

theories until the end of the Cold War equaling the security challenges only with military threats. In the following decades of the Cold War, a broader understanding of security has been developed, and the military security was complemented by non-military sector including political, economic, social, and environmental security dimensions. (Dr. Vida, 2009) Now it seems that the expanded approach of security has not taken root in security policy thinking and therefore, it has not been put into practice. It is clear that, the current international organizations involved in the European security are not able (perhaps unwilling) to consider and manage the non-military security dimensions with the same weight than the military dimension and to extend their role to them.

A generally returning statement in the security policy papers is that current security challenges are extremely complex and they change rapidly, so we can only meet the challenges through the development of common capabilities and joint actions. However, if we leave the challenge of such magnitude and complexity as the epidemic and its aftermath to individual nations, then the nice and continuously repeated principles of cooperation, unity, joint actions etc. will not prevail. In our opinion, after the 2015 migration crisis, the current epidemic is the next challenge that affects the whole of Europe, while there is no common response led by any organizations, the solution and the crisis management left for individual nations to deal with. This inevitably raises the need to review the role of international organizations involved in the security business of Europe. Jaume Duch, a spokesman for the European Parliament, also echoes this idea in his statement: "I think this crisis clearly shows that we are stronger together. The virus crosses borders and unfortunately affects all countries. If we face to such common challenges or any type of crisis, it is clear that the answer must also be common. After the crisis, if we want the EU to respond more strongly, we must also discuss the possibility of giving the EU the necessary means and powers to do so." (Index-4, 2020) At present, both the EU and NATO are focusing on maintaining military security, encouraging member states to increase their military forces and capabilities, in this way the military dimension of security can only be addressed adequately, the management of other dimensions (and there are more from these) remains for nations. Nations cannot consider suitable the value for their money that they spent for military capabilities, since they only receive a "small slice" of security for a large financial investment. Meanwhile, the expensive military forces and capabilities cannot, or just partially, be used to cope with non-military crises.

It is not a surprise that the non-military security dimension has not gained ground and deep-rooted in the policy and practice of security. Besides traditional and historic reasons, even the recent changes in the military security dimension (the occupation of the Crimea and the emergence of hybrid warfare) have given a hard push to bring collective defense and related strategies back to the front of the security thinking. In response to the challenges, it was necessary to develop a defense strategy that includes not only military forces but also civilian capabilities, governmental bodies and key players from the private sector, this strategy used a holistic approach involving the entire society.

I would like to draw the attention to critical infrastructures and resilience, because in addition to the above-mentioned NATO approach, these areas ensure the minimum level of socially required security for each society. These infrastructures provide survivability, operability for economy, services for public health and protection of environment in all type of crisis regardless its origin or link to any of the security dimensions. We have seen several

examples for this practice during the crisis management caused by the epidemic; some nations (Italian, Spanish and Hungarian) decided to shut down all factories, plants and services, which are considered "non-primary" for the current situation. They defined those vital sectors that are crucial for daily life, these were usually the same or very similar in each country. In general, health services, agriculture, food production, transportation, electricity, gas, water, pharmaceutical industry and service, telecommunications, and the press were designated as crucial, which are in line with the NATO's Baseline Requirements. In Hungary, a special action group has been established to assist and ensure the operation of the defined critical infrastructures under the leadership of the Minister of Defense.

DOMESTIC APPROACH AND REGULATION OF THE MAIN QUESTIONS OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

The Hungarian regulations are closely related to the EU regulations on the identification of critical infrastructures and the possibilities for their protection. Following the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005, the European Council called on the Commission to develop a comprehensive strategy for the protection of critical infrastructures. In this context, the Commission first adopted a Communication on "Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Fight against Terrorism" and then set out the general objectives of the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection in a Green Paper (EU Commission, 2005).

The Community Directive served the purpose of complementing the nations' existing programs for the protection of critical infrastructures. However, at that time, the regulation of activities related to critical infrastructures was still lacking in the Hungarian legal system, as in most member states of the European Union. In order to ensure a common understanding of critical infrastructures and to facilitate national legislation, a Recommendation on sectors, products and services of the critical infrastructures has been issued as an annex to the Green Paper. In Hungary, the Act on the Identification, Designation and Protection of Vital Systems and Facilities was adopted in 2012. (CLXVI.tv., 2012) This law has been prepared in accordance with the recommendations issued in the EU Green Paper, but differs from it in some respects due to different national legal and structural environment. The regulation includes the 2008 (EU 2008) EU's directive on identification and designation of the European Critical Infrastructures and to enhance their protection, and the 2016 (EU 2016) directive published later on the measures to ensure the equally high level security for network and information systems throughout the Union.

	SECTOR	SUB-SECTOR	SECTOR ACCORDING TO THE GUIDELINE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Nr. 2016/1148	EQUIVALENCY
1	Energy	Facilities of Electric System (except those elements that fall under the regulation of the nuclear power plant's security, physical defence, radiation protection.)	Electricity	Yes

	SECTOR	SUB-SECTOR	SECTOR ACCORDING TO THE GUIDELINE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Nr. 2016/1148	EQUIVALENCY
2		Oil industry	Oil	Yes
3		Gas industry	Gas	Yes
4	Transport	Road transport	Road transport	Yes
5		Rail transport	Rail transport	Yes
6		Air transport	Air transport	Yes
7		Water transport	Water transport	Yes
8		Logistic centers		
9	Agriculture	Agriculture		
10		Food industry		
11		Distribution networks		
12	Health	Active inpatient-care	Facilities of health-care (including hospitals, private clinics)	Yes
13		Control of rescue		Yes
14		Reserves of health and blood products		Yes
15		High-level security bio-laboratories		
16				
16a		Medicine-distribution		
16b	Social Insurance	Information systems and networks related to the service of Social Insurance.		
17	Finance	Infrastructures and systems of financial means, commercial and citizen payments	Infrastructures of financial market	Yes
18		Security of Banks and Credit Institutions	Bank services	Yes
19		Provision of cash		
26	Technologies of Informations-communications	Infrastructures and services of internet	Digital infrastructures	Yes
27		Fixed and mobile networks of electronic and telecommunication services		
28		Radio telecommunication		
29		Space telecommunication		

	SECTOR	SUB-SECTOR	SECTOR ACCORDING TO THE GUIDELINE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Nr. 2016/1148	EQUIVALENCY
30		Broadcasting		
31		Postal services		
32		Governmental info-communication and electronic networks		
33	Water	Provision of drinking water	Provision and distribution of drinking water	Yes
34		Quality control of surface and under- surface waters		
35		Waste-water disposal and cleaning		
36		Defence of water-bases		
37		Dams and flood-protection		
38-40*	Annulment from 01.01. 2019			
41	Public order – Law enforcement	Infrastructures of public services		
42	National defence	Infrastructures of national defence		

Table 1: Correspondence between sectors and sub-sectors under Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 on measures to ensure the equally high level security for networks, information systems, critical systems and installations defined by law (CLXVI tv, 4th ed., 2012)

There is a relevant difference between NATO's and the EU's concepts, NATO seeks to gain support to allied military operations against complex and large-scale military security challenges by building resilience, while the EU focuses on the critical infrastructures and its safeguarding at national level in order to ensure the provision of national and EU-wide sustainability based on those civilian capabilities. At the same time, the EU's approach and consequently our domestic legislation also focus on defense, including the protection against terrorism and the consequence management of a potential terrorist attack, rather than to focus on the continuous provision of the critical infrastructures' products and services in case of crisis. Despite all these differences, the current Hungarian regulations are able to provide the appropriate bases for coping with crises.

At the same time with the declaration of pandemic situation by the WHO, the Hungarian government decided on promulgating the law on state of emergency, which allowed imposing strict restrictions on assembly (more than 100 persons indoor and more than 500 persons outdoor events), border crossing and the closure of various institutions. Most probably due to early measures that Hungary has taken, there are relatively low numbers of infected cases and death toll in the country so far. However, we cannot say that everything is perfect and there is no room for further improvements in our health system, which is one


element of the critical infrastructures, was not prepared to deal with the epidemic. They had not enough protective and test equipment (masks, tests, protective clothing, etc.), respiratory equipment, ventilators, fans, hospital beds for intensive care. These shortfalls had to be mitigated by the government's urgent actions to procure tons of protective and sanitary equipment from China, the origin of the virus. Even in this way, the acquisition and the use of equipment was not risk-free, not just because of the potential further import of the virus, but also because of the sudden change of profile in many companies and the quick ramp-up of production often led to qualitative problems and faulty products. The urgent and ad-hoc procurement only reinforces the importance of the early preparations for crises. If we are not prepared to deal with crises situations (of any kind) using advanced plans in a systematic forward-looking way, we will be wasting time, delaying decision taking and hampering effective response that could result in higher number of losses of human life and material resources. In case of a sudden emergency, it may be a matter of luck to be able to procure the necessary quantity and quality of materials and equipment in a short period of time, taking into consideration the increased demand for the same articles and the usually limited production capacity. We have not mentioned yet the economic consequences of these procurements, there is no exact data for it, but it is certain that high demands and urgency are always rigging up prices, so it is pretty sure that current procurement of these assets are much more expensive than it would have been years ago. The unexpected liberation of numerous hospital beds has provoked great debate and dislike among the medical professionals and the population as well, this fact also shows that this operation was not coordinated with the hospitals and the professionals in advance, the hospitals were not pre-designated for this task. So far, there was no mention on the human factor related to the crises, doctors, nurses and other supporting staff of a hospital, who continuously provide extraordinary efforts to save life in this very hard situation. However, it is well-known that there are serious shortages of medical personnel at almost all levels. From the data published by the OECD, it can be calculated that between 2009 and 2017, roughly 12,000 doctors and three times more nurses were trained in Hungary, however, the increase in the Hungarian health system was only two thousand doctors and 1,500 nurses by 2017. (g7, 2019) Where are the others?

The situation with regard to the designation of critical facilities and services is somewhat similar. Based on the declared state of emergency, the Armed Forces was tasked to introduce military control over vital institutions and services, which mainly related to a certain range of service and production capacities in the field of transport, energy and pharmaceutical sectors. As we can see, these are all part of the critical infrastructures and are listed in the table above. The companies were designated in a relatively short period of time, but the names of the designated companies were only published when the military controllers arrived to the companies. It was considered preventive measures to inhibit the designated companies from hampering the process or excluding themselves from the procedure. All this shows that significant elements of the critical infrastructures were not pre-designated and prepared for its tasks, for those legal, management related and cooperative obligations they have to fulfill in a crisis. We think that a lessons identified exercise must be conducted after the end of this crisis summarizing all the essential experiences and incorporate them into the current regulations to make it up to date.

Based on several nations' experiences gained by this crisis we believe that ensuring the continued operation of the critical infrastructures is the root of security, both in everyday

life and in time of crisis as well. Therefore, the systematic, strategic-level planning for the development of critical infrastructures must be included into the national security strategies and planned together or parallel with the military part of it. Hungary has no long tradition in the strategic planning since the legal frameworks of it have only been set in 2012. The first two products were the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy issued in 2012. Therefore, it is no wonder that there is no tradition or practice in elaboration of a civil security strategy. The situation on the military side is significantly better due to our NATO membership. From 1999 Hungary participates in the NATO Defense Planning Process that requires a mid-term, strategic-level planning to develop our military forces and capabilities. This planning process currently sets the so-called capability targets for the development of our military forces and capabilities by 2036. These goals are integrated into our national defence (strategic) planning process, breaking them down into a ten-year time horizon, and allocating resources for its implementation. In this way, according to the Hungarian regulations, plans and ideas for the development of the armed forces are available for ten years in advance. After implementing these goals and objectives, the planned military forces and capabilities will be available to provide responses against the expected security challenges of the given period. This forward-looking strategic planning procedure is missing on the civilian side to plan and develop civilian capabilities (critical infrastructures) in a structured and systematic way.

The objectives and requirements of the National Security Strategy (NSS) issued in 2012 (Government Decree-I, 2012) were only broken down by the military side in the National Military Strategy (NMS) (Government Decree-II, 2012), and further detailed in the 10 Year National Force Development Plan and in the short term National Force Development Program. With regard to civilian capabilities, there is no an integrated strategic planning system, which would include all elements of the critical infrastructures representing the other side of the “security coin”. The military side cannot exist without civilian capabilities, and vice versa, they together form the "two sides of the security coin." In order to answer the complex challenges of our current world, only complex responses could be considered appropriate with the combination of capabilities from both, military and non-military dimensions. Therefore, we propose the following structure to develop an integrated and balanced national security planning system:



2. Figure: Proposed structure for the national strategic planning of security (Own edition)

The purpose of the NSS is, based on the analysis of the security environment and the expected security challenges, to determine the national goals and objectives including the way to achieve them together with a comprehensive system of the governmental instruments by which Hungary can enforce its national security interests in the international political arena.

Based on the goals and guidelines set out in the NSS, the NMS and the National Civil Security Strategy (NCSS) break down the expected future threats and challenges facing the country and the possibilities to address them in their strategic tasks and objectives at the level of sectors. Based on the security threats and challenges identified by the NSS, scenarios and course of actions will be developed to model the potential responses with the use of combined (military and non-military) capabilities defining the order of employment for both sides. Based on the results of modeling, main directions and priorities for the force development and the sector-specific development for the critical infrastructures will be determined, as well as the necessary tools and resources.

The 10-year development strategies/plans contain the qualitative, quantitative organizational and other requirements, as well as the rough schedule and resource allocation of the developments specifying the involved services on the military side in line with the guidance and the priorities defined in the NMS. The same procedure applies on the civilian side as well to prepare a 10 year development plan following the requirements above with the involvement of those sectors, which are indicated for prioritized development in the NCSS. In case of critical infrastructures, the allocation of developments and resources to certain sectors is of course a more complex task than in the military side, since critical infrastructures involve several sectors and include not only state-owned companies but also a large number of private and multinational companies. Therefore, wider variety of tools is needed to achieve the desired developments and investments. In addition to legal regulations, it is possible to achieve strategic goals by introducing financial, economic and other incentives, or through state security investments.

In both cases, the development programs are considered implementation program plans, which include all details of the acquisition and the development processes including the defined quantitative and qualitative requirements, resources, terms of payment, deadlines, training, education, operational and logistics procedures, and so on. We think that the well-tried NATO approach for development of military capabilities by using DOTMLPFI³ system was successful for long time, therefore, it could also be applicable for the development of civilian capabilities.

The comprehensive interpretation of security and its introduction into the national strategic planning system is currently a rough concept, based on a flexible adaptation of the long-standing military security planning system to the elements of the non-military security dimension, taking into account the specifications originating from the differences of the dimensions. The structure and procedures outlined above are in line with the 38/2012. (III. 12.) Government Decree on the Governmental Strategic Control (Government Decree, 2012), which provides an opportunity to establish horizontal co-operation among the sectors in parallel with the implementation of strategic planning in each individual sectors. A detailed planning procedure should be developed with the involvement of all participants and

³ DOTMLPFI - Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability

a proper regulation of the planning activities should be ensured. The comprehensive planning of national security should be carried out or coordinated by an organization/authority above all sectors, as the emergence of inter-sectors disputes and conflicts of interests are almost inevitable, since several sectors would interpret this activity as a reduction of their power or a possibility to access to additional resources. However, it should be noted that in general, crisis management is a governmental task, in which a significant and substantial part of the sector's power will be removed from the sectors to the central management (government), therefore it is evident that the central management should be empowered to conduct strategic planning and control all the preparations for crisis situation. At the same time, the individual sector-specific development strategies need to be complemented by the planning and controlling of the implementation of strategic security tasks and developments defined by the security strategic documents.

FINAL THOUGHTS

We believe that, due to the changed security circumstances, a significant change is needed in the approach of security, with putting equal emphasis on the military and non-military dimensions of it, as they constitute together the security as a whole.

In line with it, the mandates and tasks of international organizations involved in the European security need also to be reviewed, since the coronavirus epidemic is the second crisis (first was mass migration) in short time when nations had to face all problems alone without international assistance in anticipating, preventing or dealing with it in a coordinated way. The result of review, of course, also depends on the willingness of nations, if they insist on maintaining the status quo demonstrating their sovereignty, they will only achieve a "slice of security" with the military dimension. However, the military dimension itself will not be enough to overcome complex challenges, without developing non-military dimensions, nations will lose the complexity of their potential responses for complex challenges.

From a national perspective, we also propose to follow a broader approach of security and a comprehensive interpretation of security dimensions. As a part of this, it is recommended to introduce the non-military dimension in the strategic planning system of security and to extend the well-trying military planning system to the non-military sectors, taking into account the necessary flexibility and its specific features.

The longer-term development plans (10 years) based on coordinated priorities and systematic use of budgetary resources could ensure the development of the targeted military and non-military capabilities and assets, which will more likely address complex challenges in case of a potential crisis.

Detailed procedures for the strategic planning of security should be developed with the involvement of all participants and the appropriate regulation should be ensured in accordance with the 38/2012. (III. 12.) Government Decree on the Governmental Strategic Control.

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